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I. Definition
THE CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE Code ("Code") and the Federal
Rules ("Rules") of Evidence prohibit the use of hearsay, unless other-
wise provided.' Although the Code and the Rules do not use identical
terms, both define hearsay as an out of court statement offered at a
hearing to prove as true the propositions asserted by the declarant in
the statement.2 Both recognize that a statement can include nonver-
bal conduct if the actor intends the conduct to substitute for an oral
* Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law, Stanford University. This paper was prepared
in response to a request by the California Law Revision Commission for an assessment of
whether the California Evidence Code should be replaced by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Part I, Hearsay and Its Exceptions, is the first paper in the series and was
submitted to the Commission on May 23, 2002. The California and federal provisions
compared are those that were in effect as of December 2001.
1. See FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by
Act of Congress"); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(b) (West 1995) ("Except as provided by law,
hearsay evidence is inadmissible").
2. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (a)-(c); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 125, 135, 145, 225, 1200 (West
1995).
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or written expression or assertion.3 The classic example is the crime
scene witness who points to the accused when asked by a police officer
to identify the perpetrator.
Because only assertive nonverbal conduct is defined as hearsay,
the Code and the Rules reject the implied assertion doctrine. Suppose
an issue is whether a ship lost at sea was seaworthy. Is evidence that the
captain inspected his ship and then placed his family on it hearsay if
offered to prove that the ship was seaworthy? Under the Code and the
Rules the answer is no, unless the captain intended his acts of inspect-
ing the ship and placing his family on it to substitute for the state-
ment, "The ship is seaworthy."
For the same reason, the Code and the Rules also reject the im-
plied assertion doctrine when a verbal out of court statement is of-
fered, not for the truth of the matter stated, but as circumstantial
evidence of the declarant's belief underlying the statement. In Wright
v. Doe D. Tatham,4 an heir at law sought to set aside the testator's will
on the ground that the testator was mentally incompetent at the time
he made the will. At the trial, the beneficiary attempted to prove the
testator's competency by offering several letters written to the testator.
In one of the letters, the writer described a voyage to Virginia and the
conditions he encountered there. 5
Although the English position in Wright is to the contrary, under
the Code and the Rules receiving the letters into evidence would not
violate the hearsay rule. The letters were not offered to prove the
truth of the matters stated (for example, the conditions the writer en-
countered in Virginia), but as circumstantial evidence of the writers'
belief in the testator's competency. The writers would not have both-
ered to communicate with the testator unless they believed that he was
sufficiently possessed of his faculties to understand the letters' subject
matter.
Under the Rules, if the opponent objects to the introduction of
the letter on hearsay grounds, the opponent has the burden of per-
suading the judge that the writer intended the letter to substitute for
the statement, "The testator is competent." According to the Advisory
Committee, Federal Rule 801 "[is] so worded as to place the burden
upon the party claiming that the intention existed" and favors admissi-
3. FED. R. EVID. 801(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 225.
4. 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
5. See id. at 317-18.
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bility in ambiguous and doubtful cases.6 Under the Code, the party
claiming that hearsay falls within an exception has the burden of per-
suading the judge that it falls within the exception. 7 Presumably, the
same party would have the burden of persuading the judge that evi-
dence objected to on hearsay grounds is not hearsay. Imposing the
burden on the proponent would be consistent with the Code's posi-
tion that hearsay should be withheld from the jury because it is too
unreliable to be evaluated properly or because public policy requires
its exclusion.8
If this is the correct interpretation of the Code, different out-
comes can be expected in federal and California courts where the
hearsay declarant is not readily available to testify about his intentions.
An example is provided in United States v. Zenni.9 Suppose that an air-
port security guard, after running a metal detector over a passenger,
says, "Go on through." Over a hearsay objection, may the declaration
be received in a California or federal court to prove that the passenger
was not armed at the time? The guard's statement, obviously, is not
offered for the truth of the matter stated, as it is bereft of direct asser-
tions. Moreover, his belief that the passenger is not armed cannot be
barred under the implied assertion doctrine, since the Code and the
Rules reject the doctrine. But a California or federal judge can none-
theless sustain the hearsay objection if the judge concludes that the
guard intended his statement as a substitute for the assertion, "You are
not armed."
Whether the judge sustains the hearsay objection depends on
who has the burden of proving that the guard intended his statement
as a substitute for the assertion. Under the Code, the proponent ap-
pears to have the burden of persuading the judge that the statement is
not hearsay because the guard did not intend his statement to substi-
tute for the assertion. Because the Rules favor admissibility, the ob-
jecting party would have the burden of persuading the judge that the
statement is hearsay because the guard intended his statement as a sub-
stitute for the assertion. Who bears the burden is crucial, since the
guard's intentions are not likely to be known by anyone other than
the guard, and, presumably, the proponent is offering the guard's
statement because the guard is unavailable to testify.
6. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note. The wording of the rule does not
support this assertion by the advisory committee.
7. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 cmt. (West 1995).
8. See id.
9. 492 F. Supp. 464, 468 n.18 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
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Cases such as Zenni probably are rare, and conforming the Code
to the Rules would require simply a change to the comment to section
405 clarifying that the opponent has the burden of proving the declar-
ant's intentions. A more serious difference stems from the Rules' posi-
tion that some statements that are clearly hearsay are "not hearsay"
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d).
Subdivision (d) classifies prior statements of witnesses as not con-
stituting hearsay even if these witnesses' out of court statements are
offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. The statements em-
braced by subdivision (d) include consistent and inconsistent state-
ments, statements of identification, party admissions (including
adoptive and authorized admissions), and coconspirator's
declarations. 10
The justification for exempting these statements from the opera-
tion of the federal hearsay rule can be traced principally to Professor
Edmund Morgan. He advocated a rule, first found in the Model Code
of Evidence" l and later in the 1953 version of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 12 that would make admissible any hearsay declaration if the
judge found that the declarant was present at the hearing and subject
to cross-examination.
To a significant degree, Professor Morgan's rule coincides with
the ideal conditions for receiving testimony. Witnesses should testify
under oath in the fact-finder's presence subject to cross-examina-
tion. 3 Receiving hearsay violates these conditions whenever the hear-
say declarant is not produced for cross-examination. The hearsay rule
thus can be seen as designed to give opponents an opportunity to
cross-examine percipient witnesses under oath in the presence of the
fact finders.
The framers of the California Evidence Code rejected Professor
Morgan's position. They feared that such a rule "would permit a party
to put in his case through statements carefully prepared in his attor-
ney's office, thus enabling him to present a smoothly coherent story
which could often not be duplicated on direct examination of the de-
clarant."'14 The Rules take a contrary position with respect to prior
10. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1)-(2).
11. See MODEL CODE OF EVD. R. 503 (1942).
12. See UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953). The Uniform Rule added a further condition: the
prior statement could be admitted only if it would have been admissible if made by the
declarant while testifying as a witness.
13. See FED. R. EviD. 701, advisory committee's note, article VIII.
14. 6 CALIFORNIA I-w REVISION COMMISSION, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUD-
IES APPENDIX 313 (1964) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORrs]. They were also concerned
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statements of witnesses, presumably since by definition the declarants
must appear in court as witnesses where they can be subjected to
cross-examination under oath. 15
From an outcome perspective, it is immaterial whether prior
statements of witnesses are classified as a hearsay rule exception (as
under the Code) or exemption (as under the Rules). In either case,
the net result is that the out of court statement can be received for the
truth of the matter stated if certain other conditions are satisfied.
From a practical perspective, however, consequences do attach to the
federal treatment of prior statements. Evidence professors spend
countless hours explaining to their students how under the Rules
these statements, falling squarely within the federal definition of hear-
say, nonetheless can be received for the truth of the matters asserted
because in the words of Rule 801 (d) they are "not hearsay." Adopting
the federal approach to prior statements of witnesses would require
instructing California judges and lawyers on this elusive distinction.
Moreover, the federal approach invites additional confusion with a re-
lated concept. Out of court statements that are not offered for the
truth of the matters stated are not hearsay. If prior statements of wit-
nesses are "not hearsay," some might be misled into believing that
they cannot be offered for the truth.
California avoids these pitfalls by remaining faithful to the com-
mon law tradition. If an out of court statement is offered for the truth
of the matter stated, then it is hearsay and is not admissible unless it
falls within an exception. It is immaterial that the testimonial source
for the out of court statement might be the hearsay declarant for pur-
poses of determining whether the statement is hearsay. In this respect,
the Code, like the common law, is declaration centered.' 6 The focus is
on whether the out of court declaration is being offered for the truth.
The Rules, on the other hand, are declarant centered in the case of
prior statements of witnesses. The question is whether the out of court
declarant is on the stand subject to cross-examination under oath in
that such a rule would undermine the rule prohibiting the use of leading questions on
direct examination and the requirement that in most instances testimony be given under
oath.
15. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1), which exempts from the hearsay definition certain
out of court statements made by declarants who testify at the hearing and are subject to
cross-examination concerning their statements. The presumption is unwarranted. A party
does not have to testify in order for his or her admissions to be admissible. Moreover, the
Federal Rule allows declarations by agents and coconspirators to be offered against a party
even if the declarants do not testify. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2).
16. See Roger Park, Two Definitions of Hearsay, in EVIDENCE 90 (John Kaplan et al. eds.,
7th ed. 1991).
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the presence of the fact-finder. Regardless of the underlying merits of
the federal position, it is clear that from a practical perspective the
Code's approach is preferable.
II. Unavailability of the Hearsay Declarant
Some exceptions to the hearsay rule require the proponent to
demonstrate the unavailability of the hearsay declarant as a witness.
These include the exceptions for former testimony and statements
against interest. Under the Federal Rules, the proponent of a dying
declaration must also show the unavailability of the declarant.' 7 The
Code, on the other hand, does not impose this condition.' 8
Evidence Code section 240 sets out the grounds for determining
the unavailability of witnesses. It defines as unavailable declarants who
are (1) exempted or precluded from testifying on the grounds of priv-
ilege; (2) disqualified from testifying; (3) dead or unable to testify on
account of mental or physical illness; (4) absent from the hearing and
beyond the court's process to compel attendance; or (5) absent from
the hearing despite the proponent's reasonable efforts to compel at-
tendance through the court's process.' 9 Under the Code, the propo-
nent has the burden of persuading the judge of the declarant's
unavailability by a preponderance of the evidence.20 A declarant, how-
ever, is not unavailable if his unavailability was procured by the propo-
nent for the purpose of preventing the declarant from testifying. 2' In
this case, however, it is the opponent who has the burden. She must
persuade the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that this is the
reason for the declarant's unavailability. 22
The Federal Rules of Evidence differ from the Code in three im-
portant respects. Only two are examined here.23 First, the Rules recog-
nize that a contumacious witness-a witness who refuses to testify
despite a court order to do so-is as unavailable as a declarant who
does not attend the hearing.24 Second, the Rules acknowledge that a
17. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2).
18. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 1995).
19. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 240(a) (West 1995).
20. See CAL. Evio. CODE § 405 cmt. (West 1995).
21. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 240(b).
22. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 cmt.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (5). The Federal Rules take a more stringent approach to
the admissibility of some hearsay statements when the declarant is unavailable to testify. In
addition to the usual grounds of unavailability, in some cases the proponent must show
that an attempt was made to depose the declarant.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (2).
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witness who cannot testify because of a failure of recollection is like-
wise unavailable. 25
California cases now recognize as unavailable witnesses who re-
fuse to testify despite court orders to do so. A witness who refuses to
testify because of fear for his safety or that of his family is unavailable
under section 240 by reason of "mental illness or infirmity" due to a
"defect of personality or weakness of the will."26 Mere inconvenience,
however, including the anguish and physical discomfort that can be
produced by testifying, is insufficient to render the witness unavaila-
ble.2 7 If, on the other hand, expert testimony establishes that the phys-
ical or mental trauma suffered by a crime witness has caused such
harm that the witness cannot testify or can do so only by enduring
additional substantial trauma, the witness can be declared
unavailable. 28
California cases also recognize that a witness's memory loss can
constitute a mental or physical illness that renders the witness unavail-
able. In People v. Alcala29 the prosecution was allowed to offer a wit-
ness's former testimony after eliciting evidence from the witness that
she could not recall any matters connected with the case as a result of
a stress related disability. In upholding the trial judge's ruling, the
California Supreme Court noted that total memory loss can constitute
a "mental infirmity" within the meaning of section 240.30 Expert testi-
mony is unnecessary to establish that the loss constitutes a mental in-
firmity. The witness's own testimony, if believed by the trial judge, can
support a finding of unavailability on this basis.
31
The California cases demonstrate the wisdom of the Rules in in-
cluding the contumacious witness and the witness who suffers substan-
tial memory loss among those who are unavailable to testify. The Code
should be amended to include these grounds, and consideration
should be given to including some of the language of the cases in a
comment to serve as guidance for their application.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (3).
26. See People v. Rojas, 542 P.2d 229, 235-36 (Cal. 1975) (Webster's definition of
"infirmity," when considered with the wide discretion given judges to determine necessity
in a particular case, "permits the trial court to consider whether a mental state induced by
fear of personal or family harm is a 'mental infirmity' that renders the person harboring
the fear unavailable as a witness.").
27. See People v. Williams, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 421 (Ct. App. 1979).
28. See id.
29. 842 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1992).
30. See Alcala, 842 P.2d at 1212-13.
31. See id. at 1214.
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III. Exceptions
The Code contains more exceptions to the hearsay rule than do
the Rules. In addition, in some instances the exceptions that overlap
contain significant differences.
A. Prior Inconsistent Statements
Under the Code, statements that are inconsistent with the declar-
ant's testimony may be offered to impeach the declarant, as well as for
the truth of the matter stated.32 Extrinsic evidence of the statement,
however, may not be received unless the declarant is given an oppor-
tunity to explain or deny the statement before the close of the evi-
dence.3 3 The Rules take a similar approach, but such statements may
be used substantively only if "given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposi-
tion."34 The Federal Rule, as originally prescribed by the United States
Supreme Court, was identical to the Code. Congress, however, placed
the limitation on the substantive use of the statements because of con-
cerns about their reliability. 35 California appellate opinions do not
confirm Congress's concerns. Measured by this standard, there ap-
pears to be no justification for imposing a similar restriction on the
hearsay use of prior inconsistent statements in California.
In June 1982, the California electorate approved Proposition 8,
an initiative entitled "The Victims Bill of Rights." One of its provisions,
"The Right to Truth-in-Evidence," transformed the rules of evidence
applicable to criminal proceedings by amending the state constitution
to give the parties a right not to have relevant evidence excluded. 36
This provision, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote
of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evi-
dence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding .... Noth-
ing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence
relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782
or 1103.
37
A literal application of this provision would repeal all the Code
sections that ban or limit evidence bearing on the credibility of wit-
nesses, including the restriction on the extrinsic proof of prior incon-
32. SeeC AL. EvID. CODE §§ 1235, 770 (West 1995).
33. See id.
34. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (A).
35. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (A) (1) conference report.
36. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
37. Id.
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sistent statements. 38 Since such evidence is relevant, its admissibility
would be governed instead by section 352, a section expressly ex-
empted from the operation of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provi-
sion. Under section 352, a judge can exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by enumerated trial con-
cerns.39 These include the risk that the evidence may consume too
much time, unfairly prejudice the opposing party, confuse the issues,
or mislead the jury.40 A literal interpretation of the proposition would
thus replace the certainty provided by specific rules governing credi-
bility with the discretion accorded trial judges by section 352. Whether
or not the initiative has repealed the restrictions on the use of extrin-
sic evidence of prior inconsistent statements has not been decided.
41
But conforming the Code to the Rule's provision on prior inconsis-
tent statements by the super majority contemplated by the initiative
would repeal the effect of the initiative on the use of such statements.
B. Prior Consistent Statements
Both the Code and the Rules authorize the use of statements that
are consistent with a witness's testimony to be offered for the truth of
the matter stated as well as to support the witness's credibility. 42 The
principal difference is not the hearsay aspects of such statements, but
the circumstances which authorize their use. The Code allows a party
to support the credibility of a witness with statements that are consis-
tent with the witness's testimony if one of two conditions is satisfied.
4 3
First, if the witness was impeached with a prior inconsistent statement,
the witness can be rehabilitated with a consistent statement, if the
statement was made before the alleged inconsistent statement.44 Sec-
ond, where the witness has been expressly or impliedly charged with
fabricating his testimony or allowing bias or other improper motive to
shape his testimony, the witness can be rehabilitated with a prior con-
38. But cf CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 1995). Section 782 would not be affected
because it is expressly exempted from the operation of Proposition 8. Section 782 governs
the use of a complaining witness' sexual conduct to attack her credibility in sex offense
prosecutions.
39. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
40. See id.
41. See People v. Garcia, 273 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669-70 (Ct. App. 1990). A post-Proposi-
tion 8 decision discussing the need to give the witness an opportunity to explain or deny
the statement fails to mention the impact of Proposition 8 on this requirement.
42. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (d) (1) (B); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1236, 791 (West 1995).
43. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 791.
44. See§ 791(a).
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sistent statement if the statement was made before the motive to fabri-
cate or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.
45
The Rules take a more restrictive approach. A prior consistent
statement may be received only to rebut an express or implied charge
of recent fabrication or improper influence.4 6 The Rules do not con-
tain a provision equivalent to section 791 (a), which permits the use of
a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a witness if the witness has
been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement and the consistent
statement was made before the inconsistent one.47 Conforming the
Code to the Rules would require repealing this section.
Where the witness has been expressly or impliedly charged with
fabricating his testimony or allowing bias or other improper motive to
shape his testimony, the Code requires the rehabilitating party to
show that the witness made the consistent statement before the motive
to fabricate or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen. 48 The
Rules omit this requirement, but the United States Supreme Court
has read it into the Federal Rule as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion. 49 The Code's requirement should be retained in the event the
Code provision is conformed to the Federal Rule.
In California criminal cases, a literal application of Proposition 8
would repeal the restrictions on the use of consistent statements to
rehabilitate witnesses and, instead, would commit their admissibility to
the judge's discretion under section 352. Consistent statements are
probative of a witness's credibility even if the witness's credibility has
not first been attacked. Conforming the Code provision to the Federal
Rule would eliminate the effect of Proposition 8 if the re-enactment
satisfies the initiative's super majority requirements.
C. Statements of Identification
Both the Code and the Rules allow the hearsay use of a statement
previously made by a witness identifying another as a person who par-
ticipated in a crime or other occurrence.5 0 The Federal Rule imposes
no limitations on the use of the statement provided the declarant
45. See § 791(b).
46. See FED. R. EviD. 801 (d)(1)(B). But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 791 cmt. An argument
can be made that the Rules should permit such rehabilitation: offering a prior inconsistent
statement necessarily implies that the witness has fabricated his testimony since the time he
made the inconsistent statement.
47. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 791 cmt.
48. See § 791(b).
49. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159-60 (1995).
50. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(C); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1238 (West 1995).
[Vol. 37
Winter 2003]
made the statement after perceiving the person and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement.5' The Code, on the other
hand, imposes a number of limitations. To be admissible under this
hearsay exception, the proponent must show that the statement was
made at a time when the crime or other occurrence was fresh in the
declarant's memory. In addition, the proponent may not offer the
statement unless the declarant first testifies that the statement of iden-
tification was a true reflection of his or her recollection. 52 Under the
Code, subjecting the declarant to cross-examination is not a sufficient
guarantee of trustworthiness. Further, the declarant must vouch for
the accuracy of the statement. Conforming the Code to the Federal
Rule would result in the loss of these additional guarantees of
reliability.
D. Admissions by a Party
The Code and the Rules allow a party to offer the opposing
party's out of court statements for the truth of the matter asserted.53
These statements fall into four principal categories: (1) a party's own
statements; (2) statements made by others but adopted by a party; (3)
statements a party has authorized others to make on his or her behalf;
and (4) statements made by a party's co-conspirator.
1. A Party's Own Statements
The definition of a party's own statements is virtually the same
under the Code and the Rules.
5 4
2. Adoptive Admissions
The definition of adoptive admissions is virtually the same under
the Code and the Rules. 55
3. Authorized Admissions
Although the definition of authorized admissions is similar under
the Code and the Rules, the Code defines these statements as those
made by a person authorized by the party to make the statement "for
him" concerning the subject matter of the statement. 56 The Federal
51. SeeFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
52. See CAL EvID. CODE § 1238.
53. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 1995).
54. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (A) with CAL. EvID. CODE § 1220.
55. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) with CAL. EVID. CODE § 1221 (West 1995).
56. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1222 (West 1995).
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Rule also embraces statements made to the party.57 Under the Code,
statements made by an agent to the party are beyond the definition
even if the agent is authorized to make the statement. The limitation
in the Code is inadvertent and should be eliminated by adopting the
federal definition or deleting "for him."
Whether or not a party has authorized someone to make a state-
ment on his behalf presents a preliminary issue that should not be
resolved by the law of evidence, but by the law of agency. California
cases, however, have drained the exception of much of its utility by
insisting on proof that the party expressly authorized the declarant to
make the statement.58 Concerned that federal courts might impose
such a narrow construction on authorized admissions, the framers of
the Federal Rules added a new hearsay exception for statements made
"by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the rela-
tionship. '59 The California Law Revision Commission included a simi-
lar provision when it recommended the adoption of the Evidence
Code.60 The Legislature, however, deleted the provision. In light of
the judicial limitations placed on the use of authorized admissions,
the Legislature should enact the provision originally recommended by
the Law Revision Commission.
Unlike the Rules, the Code contains a hearsay exception for a
number of out of court statements akin to admissions. These state-
ments do not qualify as admissions because the declarant is not a party
to the action in which the declarations are offered and the statements
do not qualify as statements adopted or authorized by the party
against whom they are offered. But the statements would qualify as
party admissions had the declarant had been a party.
Section 1224 provides as follows:
When the liability, obligation, or duty of a party to a civil action is
based in whole or in part upon the liability, obligation, or duty of
the declarant, or when the claim or right asserted by a party to a
civil action is barred or diminished by a breach of duty by the de-
clarant, evidence of a statement made by the declarant is as admis-
sible against the party as it would be if offered against the declarant
in an action involving that liability, obligation, duty, or breach of
duty.
6 1
57. See FED. R. EVID. 80] (d) (2) (C).
58. See cases collected in MIGUEL A. MtNDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND
THlE FEDERAL RULES § 703 (2d ed.1999).
59. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d) (2) (D).
60. See COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 14 APPENDIX 485-89 (1964).
61. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1224 (West 1995).
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Labis v. Stopper62 illustrates how section 1224 can be used. Labis
sued a painting contractor for injuries she received when one of the
contractor's painters moved a drop cloth while the plaintiff was walk-
ing on it. To prove that the painter moved the drop cloth without first
looking, she offered a statement in which the painter told an investi-
gating police officer that he was not aware that anyone was on the
drop cloth when he moved it.63 The contractor's liability depended in
part on the painter's breach of the duty of care he owed the plaintiff;
consequently, since the painter's statement would have been admissi-
ble against him as an admission, it was admissible against the contrac-
tor under section 1224 for the truth of the matter stated.64
In some instances, section 1224 can confer a benefit on the plain-
tiff without according the defendant a similar advantage. Suppose that
in Labis the plaintiff had died and the action had been brought by her
survivor as a wrongful death action. Suppose also that prior to her
death the plaintiff had said that she had walked around a sawhorse
designed to keep pedestrians off the drop cloth. The statement would
not be admissible against the survivor as an admission by the party
opponent, since the decedent is not a party in the wrongful death
action. Nor would the statement be admissible under section 1224,
since the section contemplates the use of the statement against de-
fendants, not plaintiffs. To help rectify this imbalance, the Code in-
cludes a hearsay exception for some statements made by the deceased
in wrongful death actions. Under section 1227, statements made by
the deceased are as admissible against the survivor as they would have
been against the deceased in an action brought by the deceased.65
Similarly, in actions brought by parents to recover for injuries to their
children, the children's statements are as admissible against the par-
ents as they would have been against the children in an action
brought by the children. 66 Again, in actions involving property dis-
putes, declarations by a predecessor in interest are as admissible
62. 89 Cal. Rptr. 926 (Ct. App. 1970). Although CAL. EvID. CODE § 1224 would appear
to apply to any case involving the liability of an employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 14, APPENDIX 495 (1964), the California Su-
preme Court, citing lack of precedent, refused to give that construction to § 1224. Markley
v. Beagle, 429 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1967). The Labis court in turn declined to follow Markley,
holding that "it would be an unfair extension of the true rule of Markley to broaden its
language beyond its holding . Labis, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
63. See id. at 926.
64. See id.
65. See CAL. EvIn. CODE § 1227 (West 1995).
66. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1226 (West 1995).
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against successors as they would have been in action against the
predecessor.6 7
These sections permit the use of the statements even though the
parties against whom they are offered in no way authorized the declar-
ants to make the statements. The Federal Rule exempting from the
hearsay rule statements by a party's agent or servant at most might
embrace the painter's statement if under the law of agency he quali-
fies as an agent or servant.68 The Code provisions provide useful ex-
ceptions and should be retained if the Code is conformed to the
Federal Rules..6 9
4. Coconspirators' Declarations
Both the Code and the Rules allow damaging statements made by
a party's coconspirators to be offered against the party for the truth of
the matter asserted even in the absence of evidence that the party
authorized the coconspirators to make the statement on his or her
behalf.70 Coconspirators are presumed to have authorized each other
to speak for one another if certain conditions are met. These relate
principally to the circumstances attending the making of the
statements.
In California, the proponent must show that the coconspirator
made the declaration while participating in a conspiracy to commit a
crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the conspiracy.71 The pro-
ponent must also show that the coconspirator made the declaration
prior to or during the time that the opponent was participating in the
conspiracy. 72 Similarly, the Federal Rules require the proponent to
show that the declaration was made by the coconspirator during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 73 And though the Rules
67. See CAL. Evi). CODE § 1225 (West 1995).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (D).
69. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995) for a list of the conditions that must be
satisfied for the children's hearsay statements to be received. In some instances, hearsay
statements by children who have been abused sexually may be offered for the truth of the
matter stated in order to comply with the foundational requirements for the introduction
of the confessions of the persons accused of abusing the children.
70. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (d) (2) (E); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223 (West 1995).
71. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223 cmt. Statements not in furtherance of the conspiracy
are outside the exception because they are not the acts "of the conspiracy for which the
party, as a coconspirator, is legally responsible." Underlying this concept is the notion that
conspirators act as agents for each other only with respect to acts and statements that
promote the agreed upon criminal enterprise. See FED. R. EVD. 801 (d) (2) (E) advisory
committee's note.
72. See CAL. Evi). CODE § 1223.
73. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (2) (D).
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seemingly require the proponent to show that the declaration was
made while the declarant was a coconspirator of the party opponent,
case law holds that, as in California, declarations made prior to the
time the party joined the conspiracy are admissible against the party.
The major differences between the California and federal ap-
proaches to coconspirators' declarations concern the standard that
must be met in proving the preliminary or foundational facts and the
kind of evidence that can be offered to satisfy the standard. In Califor-
nia, a sufficiency standard applies.74 Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the proponent, the judge must be convinced that a
reasonable fact finder could find the foundational facts.75 In making
this showing, however, the proponent is limited to offering admissible
evidence. 76 This limitation precludes bootstrapping. Over a hearsay
objection, the proponent may not offer the coconspirator's hearsay
declaration as evidence of the foundational requirements. 77
The Federal Rules are seemingly more protective of the accused
than is the Code. The United States Supreme Court has construed the
Rules to require the proponent to prove the foundational facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. 78 This added protection, however, is
undercut by the Rules' position permitting the proponent to offer the
coconspirator's hearsay declaration as evidence of the existence of the
74. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223(c).
75. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 cmt. (West 1995). Some reviewing courts do not under-
stand the role of trial judges in determining the existence of preliminary facts under a
prima facie standard. Confusing the sufficiency standard with proof by a preponderance of
the evidence, some hold that for a co-conspirator's declaration to be admissible the propo-
nent has to "proffer sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to determine that the
conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the evidence." People v. Herrera, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d
911, 922 (Ct. App. 2000), and cases cited therein. For purposes of admissibility, the ques-
tion for the trial judge is merely whether a reasonable juror could find that a conspiracy
existed if the proponent's evidence is believed. Whether jurors should be instructed to
disregard the evidence after it has been admitted unless they find the conspiracy by some
higher standard is a separate question. In California, for example, jurors are routinely told
to disregard evidence of uncharged misdeeds unless they first find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the misdeed was committed. See MIGUEL MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CODE
AND THE FEDERAL RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH § 3.17 (2d ed.1999). The 2001 revision to
CALJIC 6.24 warns jurors not to consider a coconspirator's declaration unless they first
find the foundational facts, including the conspiracy, by a preponderance of the evidence.
76. The Law Revision Commission recommended a rule on preliminary fact determi-
nations that would have permitted the judge to consider inadmissible evidence in some
instances. See COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 14, at 19-21 (1964). The proposed rule,
however, was rejected by the Legislature, which instead retained the practice of requiring
the use of admissible evidence. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 400-406 (West 1995).
77. See People v. Longines, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 359 (Ct. App. 1995).
78. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
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conspiracy and of the accused's participation. 79 In enacting the rule
governing the proof of preliminary facts Congress adopted the ap-
proach recommended by the California Law Revision Commission but
rejected by the Legislature: the judge, in making preliminary fact de-
terminations, is not bound by the rules of evidence except those re-
garding privileges.8 Consequently, a federal judge can consider the
coconspirator's declaration in determining whether the prosecution
has proved the conspiracy and the accused's participation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, even though the use of the declaration
for these purposes violates the hearsay rule."
A federal judge, however, may not rely on the coconspirator's
statement alone to find the preliminary facts. A 1997 amendment to
Federal Rule 801 provides that the "contents of the statement are not
alone sufficient to establish ... the existence of the conspiracy and the
participation therein of the declarant and the party against whom the
statement is offered ... ."82The judge, in addition, must consider "the
circumstances surrounding the statement, such as the identity of the
speaker, the context in which the statement was made, or evidence
corroborating the contents of the statement in making its determina-
tion as to each preliminary question."83
If the Code is conformed to the Federal Rule, California should
retain the provision making a coconspirator's declaration admissible
even if it was made prior to the time the party against whom it was
offered joined the conspiracy. Whether the Code should be amended
to allow judges to consider inadmissible evidence (other than privi-
leged information) in making foundational determinations presents
difficult questions regarding the proper allocation of power between
judge and jury, and are left for later consideration. The related ques-
tion of whether the foundational facts should be proved only by a suf-
ficiency standard or by a preponderance of the evidence.
E. Contemporaneous Statements
Section 1241 creates a hearsay exception for statements which are
"offered to explain, qualify, or make understandable conduct of the
declarant" and which were "made while the declarant was engaged in
79. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (1).
80. See id.
81. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) advisory committee's note.
82. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2).
83. Id. at advisory committee's note.
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such conduct. 's 4 Trustworthiness is derived from the requirement
that the declaration be contemporaneous with the conduct that is be-
ing explained, qualified, or made understandable.
The Assembly Committee questioned the need for this exception,
noting that some commentators do not regard the kinds of the state-
ments contemplated by section 1241 to be hearsay.8 5 For example,
under the laws relating to personal property, merely lending a pen to
someone does not strip the lender of ownership of the pen; it creates
only a bailment. But giving the pen to another can transfer ownership
by creating an inter vivos gift. Whether a bailment or inter vivos gift
was created depends on the intention of the owner. Thus, if in the act
of handing the pen the owner says, "Use my pen," only a bailment is
created. But if the owner says, "I want you to have this pen," then an
inter vivos transfer is effected.
Section 1241 is designed to remove any hearsay barriers to these
kinds of statements. Depending on which statement the owner made,
the declarations will clarify whether a bailment or inter vivos gift was
intended. But closer analysis discloses that no hearsay is involved.
These statements are verbal acts. When the substantive law governing
the action invests certain utterances with legal significance, then proof
of those utterances does not violate the hearsay rule.
The Federal Rules do not contain a hearsay exception for con-
temporaneous statements, most likely because there is no need for an
exception for these kinds of statements. Instead, Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(1) creates an exception for present sense impressions,
statements "describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immedi-
ately thereafter."8 6 The Law Revision Commission recommended an
exception for present sense impressions,87 but the Legislature re-
jected the recommendation and adopted only the exception for con-
temporaneous statements.
The Code looks inwardly, creating an exception for statements
reflecting the declarant's state of mind regarding his own conduct.88
The Rules focus outwardly, providing an exception for statements
describing external phenomena. The present sense impressions con-
templated by Rule 802(1) are much closer to excited utterances.
84. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241 (West 1995).
85. See id. at cmt.
86. FED. R. EvID. § 803(1).
87. See COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 14, at APPENDIX 471 (1964).
88. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241.
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However, present sense impressions differ from excited utter-
ances under the Federal Rules in two significant respects. First, while
excited utterances can be made at any time during the excited state,
present sense impressions must be made while the declarant is per-
ceiving the event or shortly thereafter.89 Moreover, under the Rules,
excited utterances need only relate to the startling event that gives rise
to the declaration; present sense impressions are limited to statements
describing or explaining the event or condition. °° "[In] the absence
of a startling event, [they] may extend no farther."9
Although a hearsay exception is not necessary for the kind of
statements contemplated by section 1241, it should be retained to the
extent that confusion may still abound about the hearsay status of
such statements. On the other hand, an exception is needed for pre-
sent sense impressions. As in the case of contemporaneous state-
ments, the requirement of the event's and the statement's substantial
contemporaneity diminish the likelihood of deliberate and conscious
misrepresentation.9 2 The Code should be conformed to the Rules by
providing an exception for present sense impressions.
F. Excited Utterances
Both the Code and the Rules create a hearsay exception for spon-
taneous utterances made while the declarant was under the stress of
an exciting or startling event.9 3 The scope of the exceptions is not
identical, however. Under the Code, the exception is limited to those
statements that purport "to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condi-
tion, or event perceived by the declarant,"94 while under the Rules,
the statement only needs to relate to the startling event or
condition.95
California cases have not applied the limitation in section 1240.
Statements admitted under the California exception include a decla-
ration in which the declarant identified his assailant as an acquain-
tance and drug customer of his roommate96 and a statement by a rape
victim in which the victim reported that the accused had confessed to




93. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240(b) (1993).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240(a).
95. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
96. See, e.g., People v. Farmer, 254 P.2d 940, 950 (Cal. 1989).
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a murder in the course of raping her.97 In light of the liberal interpre-
tation given to the Code, section 1240 should be amended to include
statements relating to the startling event.
G. State of Mind Declarations
1. Declarations Regarding Then Existing Mental State
The Code and the Rules provide a hearsay exception for declara-
tions in which the declarant describes a then existing state of mind. 98
The insistence on contemporaneity furnishes the exception with trust-
worthiness. Expressions of existing feelings and discomforts-as op-
posed to narratives of past feelings and miseries-are likely to be
sincere and spontaneous. 99 The need for this kind of evidence also
justifies the exception, since it is difficult to divine what people think
unless they tell us. Nonetheless, reservations about the reliability of
these expressions caused the Code framers to include a provision em-
powering trial judges to exclude them if they find that the declara-
tions "were made under circumstances such as to indicate [their] lack
of trustworthiness." 100 The Federal Rule does not contain this
limitation.
The Code makes clear that declarations of a then existing state of
mind can be offered to prove the declarant's state of mind at that time
or at any other time when the mental state itself is an issue in the
action.' 0 1 Accordingly, the declaration can be offered as circumstan-
tial evidence that the declarant had a similar state of mind prior to or
subsequent to the time period embraced in the declaration. The Fed-
eral Rule does not contain a similar provision, but the Rules' rele-
vance provisions should permit a similar use of the declarations in
federal court.
The Code also contains a provision expressly allowing a declara-
tion of a then existing mental state to be used to prove or explain acts
or conduct of the declarant. 10 2 An example would be the use of a
declaration regarding future plans to prove that the declarant imple-
mented those plans. Again, the Federal Rule does not contain an anal-
ogous provision, but such use is allowed by the Rules' relevance
provisions.
97. See People v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980, 1017 (Cal. 1996).
98. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1995).
99. See COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 14, at APPENDIX at 505.
100. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1252 (West 1995).
101. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(a) (1).
102. See id. § 1250(a) (2).
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Declarations concerning future plans are controversial because
often they include the future plans of individuals other than the hear-
say declarant. In People v. Alcalde10 3 the accused was tried for murder-
ing a woman he had been seeing socially. At issue was the admissibility
of a declaration made by the victim on the day of the killing in which
she stated that she was "going out with Frank" that evening. 10 4 "Frank"
was the accused's first name. The accused objected that the victim's
declaration was inadmissible to prove his future plans to see the vic-
tim. The California Supreme Court upheld the use of the declaration,
noting that in overruling the objection the trial judge had taken "the
precaution to state in the presence of the jury that the evidence was
admitted for the limited purpose of showing the decedent's inten-
tion." 0 5 The Code, which was enacted after Alcalde, underscores the
point by limiting these declarations to proving or explaining the acts
or conduct of the declarant.10 6
The California courts, however, have not abided by this limita-
tion. Although the California Supreme Court has declined to rule on
whether the Evidence Code limits Alcalde to proving only the declar-
ant's future plans, 10 7 some lower courts have mistakenly construed an-
other Supreme Court case, People v. Morales,'°8 as allowing the use of a
declaration regarding future plans to prove the plans of others in ad-
dition to those of the declarant.10 9
103. 148 P.2d 627 (Cal.1944).
104. Id. at 630.
105. Id.
106. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(a) (2).
107. See People v. Melton, 750 P.2d 741, 755 (Cal. 1988).
108. 770 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1989).
109. See, e.g., People v. Han, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 147 (Ct. App. 2000) (declarant's
statement that she wanted to arrange her sister's murder was admissible to prove that the
declarant and the accused conspired to murder the sister).
In Morales, the accused was prosecuted for murder. The prosecution's theory was that
the accused had killed the victim as part of a conspiracy. Over a defense hearsay objection,
a witness was allowed to testify to overhearing the declarant, Ortega, state that he intended
to kill the victim and would enlist the accused's aid. See id. The California Supreme Court
approved the use of the declaration. Ortega's declaration concerning his plan to kill the
victim with the accused's aid fell within the exception for state of mind declarations regard-
ing future plans. The declaration was probative of his soliciting the accused to help him kill
the victim, and in the court's view, such a solicitation in turn was probative of a conspiracy
between the accused and Ortega to kill the victim. See id. at 257. While this relevance
analysis is correct, it still raises disturbing questions. If Ortega had said that he intended to
conspire with the accused to kill the victim, then under Alcalde and the plain language of
the Code, the statement would have been admissible only to prove Ortega's participation
in such a conspiracy but not the accused. Morales makes no mention of Melton.
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The Federal Rule does not contain the limitation found in the
Code. However, in approving the Federal Rule, the House Committee
on the Judiciary expressed agreement with such a limitation. In its
report the committee stated its intent that Federal Rule of Evidence
803(3) "be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Hillmon... so as to render statements of intent by a declarant ad-
missible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of
another person." 110 Hilimon is the classic case exploring the use of
declarations regarding future plans. Despite the House's unambigu-
ous position, some appellate federal courts, including the Ninth Cir-
cuit, have approved the use of the declarations to prove the future
conduct of others."' The Code should retain the limitation.
2. Declarations Regarding a Past State of Mind
As a general rule, the Code and the Rules prohibit the use of a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or be-
lieved. 112 Otherwise, the hearsay rule might be inadvertently repealed
since any statement of a past event is a statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind regarding the past event.
The Code, however, creates a hearsay exception for declarations
of past state of mind in three circumstances. First, the Code creates an
exception where the previous mental state is itself an issue in the case
and the declaration is not offered to prove any fact other than that
mental state, and the declarant is unavailable to testify. 113 The Rules
do not contain an equivalent provision.
Second, the Code creates an exception where the statement was
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describes
medical history, including past as well as present symptoms, insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.11 4 The exception,
however, applies only to a statement made by a victim when the victim
is a minor at the time of proceedings, "provided the statement was
made when the victim was under the age of 12 describing any act, or
attempted act, of child abuse or neglect."' 1 5 This exception is merely a
truncated version of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4).
110. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) Report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
112. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1995).
113. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1251 (West 1995).
114. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1253 (West Supp. 2002).
115. Id.
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Finally, the Code creates an exception where the statement con-
sists of the declarants' contention that they have or have not made a
will, or have or have not revoked a will.' 16 The Rules contain a similar
provision. 117 Under the Code, however, the declaration is not admissi-
ble if the declarant is available to testify.' 18 The Rules do not impose
this limitation.
Unlike the Code, the Rules contain a broad hearsay exception for
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Rule
803(4) provides an exception for statements made "for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."' ' 9 Unlike the California excep-
tion, the Federal Rule is not limited to statements made by minors
describing acts or attempted acts of child abuse and neglect.
Rule 803(4) is a marked and generous departure from the com-
mon law. It includes present as well as past symptoms, and it is imma-
terial whether the physician was consulted for treatment or for the
purpose of enabling the doctor to testify. The declarant's motive goes
to the statements weight, not admissibility.120 Moreover, it is not indis-
pensable for the statement to be made to a doctor. "Statements to
hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the fam-
ily" can be included if reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment. '
2 1
Under Rule 803(4), statements of causation are also admissible if
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 122 Knowing what
caused an injury can assist a doctor in making the proper diagnosis or
formulating the appropriate treatment. Thus, even a child's statement
about the identity of the person who molested her is admissible if
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 2 3 The fact that
the statement may embrace the identity of the perpetrator does not
detract from its reliability: a "patient can be expected to tell the truth
about her injury because she will want to be diagnosed correctly and
116. See CAL. Evio. CODE § 1260 (West 1995).
117. See FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
118. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1260.
119. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
120. See id. at advisory committee's note.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1993).
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treated appropriately."1 24 But even under the Federal Rule, state-
ments relating to fault do not generally qualify: "Thus a patient's state-
ment that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his
statement that the car was driven through a red light.' 25
The Legislature has taken one step toward the federal approach
in enacting section 1253. The Legislature should take the additional
step of replacing section 1253 with the federal rule.
H. Past Recollection Recorded
Although using a different language, the Code and the Rules pro-
vide a hearsay exception for recorded recollection if the witness has
insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately. 26 The Code,
however, includes an additional limitation: Only those recorded state-
ments that would have been admissible if made by the witness while
testifying are admissible. 127 Presumably, the same outcome would be
obtained in federal court since the Federal Rule does not preclude
the opponent from using other grounds to object to the admissibility
of the recorded statement. The California limitation prevents confu-
sion on this point and should be retained.
I. Business Records
Evidence in the form of testimony that otherwise might be barred
by the hearsay rule may be admissible under the exception for busi-
ness records. The justification is rooted in the legal acceptance of
businesses practices as well as necessity. If businesses rely on business
records "in the most important undertakings of mercantile and indus-
trial life," then such records should be sufficiently trustworthy for use
in court. 128 There is substantial overlap between the California and
federal exceptions for business records. Both define a business
broadly 29 and require the entry to be made in the regular course of
124. Id. If the statement, however, was not made for the purposes of diagnosis or treat-
ment, then it is not admissible under the Federal Rule. In Ignacio, for example, the victim's
statement to the doctor was admissible because it was made for these purposes, but not her
statement to a social worker who was simply trying to ensure the victim's safety. The record
was devoid of any evidence indicating that the child made the statements to the social
worker for medical purposes.
125. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
126. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1237 (West 1995).
127. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1237.
128. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
129. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1270 (West 1995).
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business at or near the time the recorded event took place.'-"" In addi-
tion, both dispense with the need to call a witness to identify the re-
cord and testify about the record's mode of preparation under
specified circumstances.13 ' There are some differences between the
California and federal approaches, however.
First, the Federal Rule requires the proponent to show that it was
the regular practice of the business to create the record, not just that
it was created in the course of regularly conducted business activity.' 32
Second, the Code and the Rules give the judge the power to exclude a
record otherwise satisfying the foundational requirements if the judge
determines that the sources of information used to create the record,
or the method and circumstances of preparation, indicate lack of
trustworthiness. In California, however, over objection the proponent
must show that the record is trustworthy. 133 In federal court, it is the
opponent who must persuade the judge of the record's untrustworthi-
ness.1 34 Admissibility is assumed in the first instance under the Rules.
Third, the Federal Rule explicitly states that an opinion or diag-
nosis can qualify as an admissible entry. The Code omits these terms,
but the opponent can always object to an entry on the ground that it
constitutes an inadmissible opinion.
Whether opinions in business records can be received as part of
the record depends on the application of the opinion rule. In Califor-
nia and federal courts, a lay witness may not testify in the form of an
opinion unless the opinion is rationally based on the witness's percep-
tion and is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testi-
mony.13 5 An officer's statement in a police report that "it was raining"
would qualify. The officer's conclusion would be based on his own
perception and would surely help the fact finder understand the of-
ficer's perception of the weather conditions.
An expert, on the other hand, may not testify in the form of an
opinion unless (1) the expert is qualified to give the opinion, and (2)
the fact finder needs the opinion in resolving important factual is-
sues. 136 In a personal injury case, for example, an important question
130. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6), CAL. EwD. CODE § 1271 (West 1995).
131. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 712, 1560-1566, 1567 (West 1995).
132. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
133. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1271(d), 405 cmt.
134. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
135. See FED. R. EVID. 701; CAL. EVID. CODE § 800 (West 1995). Section 800 also permits
lay witnesses to testify in the form of an opinion to the extent "permitted by law."
136. See FED. R. EVID. 702; CAL. EviD. CODE § 801 (West 1995). Other limitations also
apply. Federal judges, for example, may exclude opinions that are not scientifically valid.
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may be whether the injuries suffered by the plaintiff are permanent. It
is unlikely that ajury listening to the plaintiffs complaints can resolve
this issue. An opinion by a qualified physician would help. Accord-
ingly, such an opinion in a medical report otherwise admissible under
the exception would be admissible.
The point is that nothing in the exception for business records
favors or disfavors opinions. 137 Whether a particular opinion is admis-
sible depends in the first instance on whether it would be admissible
through the hearsay declarant if the declarant testified at the hearing.
The California courts, however, have taken a more restrictive ap-
proach. Opinions in business records should be limited to readily ob-
servable acts, events or conditions. 138 Thus, an opinion that the
plaintiff suffered a broken leg should be admitted, but not an opinion
that he suffers from a psychiatric condition.139 The greater the
thought process required to reach an opinion, the greater the need
for cross examining the hearsay declarant. 140
The Federal Rules take a more expansive approach. "Opinions"
and "diagnoses" may be admitted as part of business records if such
opinions would be admissible through the hearsay declarant as a
witness. 1 4 1
The Code and the Federal Rule retain the business duty rule. The
rule requires the proponent to show that observations reflected in a
record emanate from percipient witnesses who had a duty to observe
and report their observations. Neither rule incorporates the business
duty rule explicitly, but the commentary to both makes clear that ap-
plication of the business duty rule is required. 142
California judges may exclude opinions based on novel scientific principles or techniques
that have not been generally accepted by the pertinent scientific community. See generally,
MENDEZ, supra note 14, at §1604.
137. The fact that Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) includes "opinions" and "diagno-
ses" among the matters that are admissible in business records does not mean that in fact
they must be admitted in a given record.
138. See People v. Reyes, 526 P.2d 235-36 (Cal. 1974); see also People v. Campos, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 113, 114-15 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that records containing opinions concern-
ing the accused's mental state were not admissible as business or official records of acts,
conditions, or events).
139. See Reyes, 526 P.2d at 225.
140. See id.
141. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
142. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 cmt.
(West 1995).
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J. Absence of Entry in Business Records
Just as entries in business records may be used to prove the occur-
rence of an act or event, or the existence of a condition, the absence
of such entries may be offered to prove their nonoccurrence or non-
existence. A creditor, for example, may prove nonpayment by evi-
dence that his records do not reflect that payment was received. The
use of records for this purpose may not violate the hearsay rule. The
creditor, for example, probably does not intend his failure to make a
payment entry to substitute for the statement that the debtor has
failed to make the payment. Most likely, the creditor did not make the
entry because no payment was received. But because the question has
not been free of controversy, the Law Revision Commission and the
framers of the Federal Rules opted for creating a hearsay exception
for the absence of entries. 143 As in the case of business records, the
Federal Rule assumes admissibility if the foundational requirements
are satisfied, unless the opponent convinces the judge of the record's
lack of trustworthiness. 44 Under the Code, it is the proponent who,
over objection, must establish the record's trustworthiness.145
K. Official Records
Although the Code and the Rules create a hearsay exception for
official records, each takes a radically different approach to their ad-
missibility. Under the Code, a record of an act, condition, or event is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or
criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition, or event if the writing
was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee, the
writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event
recorded, and the sources of information and method and time of
preparation were such as to indicate trustworthiness. 146 Because the
same showing of trustworthiness is required of California official
records as for California business records, the limitations imposed on
business records apply to official ones as well. Official records are
equally subject to the opinion rule and the rule requiring those who
impart information to the preparer to be under a duty to provide such
information. In People v. Baeske,147 for example, a police report offered
143. See FED. R. EvID. 803(7) advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1272 cmt.
(West 1995).
144. See FED. R. EVID. 803(7).
145. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 405 cmt., 1272(b) (West 1995).
146. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1280 (West 1995).
147. 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335 (Ct. 1976).
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to prove a license number was excluded because the individual who
provided the number was "not a public employee with any duty either
to observe facts correctly or to report her observations accurately to
the police department.1 48 But as in the case of business records,
other hearsay exceptions may supply the required reliability. In Jack-
son v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 149 the issue was the admissibility of a
statement in a police report in which the plaintiff admitted driving a
car. Although the officer who took the statement did not see who
drove the car, the statement was nonetheless admitted for the truth of
the matter stated. The plaintiff's statement fell within the admissions
exception to the hearsay rule, and the officer had firsthand knowl-
edge of what the plaintiff said as well as a duty to record the informa-
tion.15 0 As in the case of business records, the entrant does not have to
have firsthand knowledge of the information contained in the official
record. If the exception's other requirements are satisfied, the trust-
worthiness requirement can be established by showing that the official
record is based upon the observations of public employees who have a
duty to observe the facts recorded and to report their observations
correctly to those making the entries.' 51
The federal exception for public records and reports has three
distinct parts. Part (A) creates a hearsay exception for the records of
public offices and agencies setting forth the activities of the office or
agency; part (B) creates a hearsay exception for records of public of-
fices and agencies setting forth matters observed pursuant to a duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, but
excluding in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel; part (C) creates a hearsay excep-
tion for records of public offices and agencies setting forth in civil
actions and proceedings, and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant
148. Id. at 385; see also People v. Hernandez, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 779 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that a computer printout which was prepared by a crime analyst from police
reports and which identified the accused as the probable perpetrator of the rapes being
tried was inadmissible as an official or business record, because the persons who furnished
the information contained in the reports were under no duty to do so); Behr v. County of
Santa Cruz, 342 P.2d 987, 992 (Cal.1959).
149. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712 (Ct. App. 1994).
150. See id. at 718; see also Ruff v. Yan, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157, 172 (Ct. App. 2000)
(holding a party's admissions to a police officer, which the officer incorporated into his
report, are admissible if the report meets the requirements of the official record's excep-
tion to the hearsay rule).
151. See Baeske, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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to authority granted by law.152 As in the case of business records, the
Federal Rule assumes admissibility if all of the foundational require-
ments are met, unless the opponent persuades the judge that the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness. 53
The federal approach to official records departs from that of the
Code in two significant respects. First, the Rules limit the admissibility
of such records when offered against the accused in criminal cases,
and, second, the Rules expand the admissibility of reports containing
opinions in civil cases and in criminal cases, when offered against the
government.
1. Criminal Cases
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) creates a hearsay exception for
reports "in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth ... (B)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases mat-
ters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel
.... " In United States v. Oates,'5 the Second Circuit held that this
provision required excluding a government chemist's report offered
against the accused. Reasoning that the chemist was a member of the
law enforcement team, the court concluded that the report fell within
the prohibition of the rule.' 5 6
The government contended that the use of the report was proper
because the report also satisfied the federal exception for business
records.157 While not denying that the report qualified as a business
record, 58 the Second Circuit rejected the government's argument. 59
In the court's view, extensive amendments by Congress to the excep-
tion for official records evidenced Congress's concern with trying
criminal defendants by police report. Though not holding that the
use of the chemist's report would violate the accused's right of con-
frontation, 6° the court refused to permit the government to circum-
152. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)-(C).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 803(C).
154. FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(B).
155. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 445 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 591
F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1978).
156. See 560 F. 2d at 67-68.
157. See id. at 74.
158. See id. at 75.
159. See id. at 78.
160. See id. at 80.
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vent the balance struck by Congress in Rule 803(8) by allowing the
government to resort to other hearsay exceptions. 161 Other circuits,
though not all, have embraced Oates.162
The California exception for official records is devoid of any lan-
guage limiting the use of the records when offered against the ac-
cused. In California, the accused would have to object on Sixth
Amendment grounds.
Some circuits have drawn a distinction between reports prepared
by law enforcement personnel who were in an adversarial position to
the accused, and those prepared by personnel who were indifferent to
the accused. In United States v. Orozco,163 for example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the use of border crossing cards by immigration officials
to prove that a car registered to the accused had crossed from Mexico
into the United States shortly before narcotics were found in the car.
While conceding that the immigration officials could be deemed law
enforcement personnel, the court nonetheless upheld the use of the
cards on the ground that they were trustworthy.1 64 The cards had
been prepared as part of a routine practice and at a time when the
government and its agents were not in an adversarial position vis-d-vis
the accused. 65
2. Civil Cases
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) creates a hearsay exception for
records "in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth... (c)
in civil actions and proceedings ... factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the
sources of information or circumstances indicate lack of trustworthi-
161. See id. at 84. The Second Circuit, however, has retreated somewhat from this posi-
tion. In United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1983), it held that Oates did not
preclude the government from offering a record to prove the absence of an entry under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10), even though the record would be inadmissible as an
official record.
162. See United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit agrees
but would allow the use of another hearsay exception if the preparer of the record takes
the stand. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit allows
the use of other hearsay exceptions. See United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.
1988).
163. 590 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1979).
164. See id. at 793-94. This provision allows defendants in criminal cases to offer factual
findings in investigative reports against the government. But it does not authorize the gov-
ernment to offer such findings against defendants in criminal cases. Accordingly, this pro-
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ness .... 166 The broad scope of this exception was examined by the
United States Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,167 a
wrongful death action brought by the spouses of two pilots killed in an
aircraft accident against the manufacturer of the plane. The plaintiffs'
theory was that the accident had been caused by engine failure. The
manufacturer countered that the accident had been caused by pilot
error. The question before the Court was the admissibility of a Judge
Advocate General's report in which the investigator concluded,
among other matters, that the "most probable cause of the accident
was the pilots [sic] failure to maintain proper interval."' 68
In upholding the admissibility of the report, the Court rejected
the argument that the "factual findings" contemplated by the rule ex-
cluded factually based conclusions or opinions:169 "[P]ortions of in-
vestigatory reports otherwise admissible under Rule (8) (C) are not
inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion. As
long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies
the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along
with other portions of the report."'170
The Advisory Committee lists four factors federal judges should
consider in determining the reliability of investigative reports: (1) the
timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or experi-
ence; (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was
conducted; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared with a
view to possible litigation. 171
In reaching its decision, the Court was influenced by the Rules'
approach to admissibility. Under the exceptions for business and offi-
cial records, admissibility is assumed unless the opponent raises seri-
ous questions of reliability.' 7 2 Under the Code, it is the proponent
who must satisfy the judge that the business or official record is
trustworthy. 173
166. FED. R. EvID. 803(8) (C).
167. 488 U.S. 153 (1988), on remand, 868 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1989).
168. 488 U.S. at 157.
169. See id. at 164.
170. Id. at 170. The Court declined to rule on the admissibility of conclusions of law
under the Rules.
171. See FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's note; see also Beech. v. Rainey, 488
U.S. at 168 n. 11.
172. See FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
173. See CAL. Evm.. CODE §§ 1271(d), 1280(c), 405 (West 1995).
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Would such a report be admissible in California? In Elsworth v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.,174 the judge admitted a report of a Congressional
committee which in turn referred to a study prepared by an employee
of the General Accounting Office. The study stated that the FAA had
considered withdrawing Beech's authorization to participate in an air-
worthiness certification process because Beech had failed to comply
with enumerated obligations imposed by the FAA. The California Su-
preme Court held that the study was inadmissible. 175 The holding,
however, is not dispositive of the question. Because the court found,
among other matters, that the proponent had failed to produce evi-
dence of the author's identity, 176 it held that the judge lacked a basis
for finding that the study was prepared from sources of information
that indicate trustworthiness.1 77
A better guide to the admissibility of "factual findings" in Califor-
nia can be found in the court's approach to the admissibility of opin-
ions in business or official records. As discussed above, the court has
taken a cautious approach. The court has not taken the unequivocal
position that opinions in records should be admissible if the opinions
satisfy the conditions of admissibility imposed by the opinion rule.17 8
Rather, the court seems to favor a rule limiting opinions in records to
readily observable acts, events, or conditions.' 79 In People v. Reyes' 80
the court suggested that an opinion that an individual suffered a bro-
ken leg should be admitted but not an opinion that he suffered from
a psychiatric condition.' 8 ' In the court's view, the greater the thought
process required to reach an opinion or conclusion, the greater the
need for cross examining the hearsay declarant. 18 2 Applying this test,
a California judge might well conclude that findings or opinions
based on extensive investigations should not be received through an
official or business record. Perhaps this is why early cases expressed
the view that "records of investigations and inquiries conducted either
voluntarily or pursuant to requirement of law by public officers con-
cerning causes and effects, and involving the exercise of judgment
174. 691 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1984).





180. 526 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1974).
181. See id. at 235-36.
182. See id.
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and discretion, expression of opinion, and the making of conclusions,
are not admissible in evidence as public records."' 8 3
L. Judgments of Conviction
In California, a final judgment adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable as a felony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay
rule when offered in a civil action to prove any fact essential to the
judgment. 1 4 It is immaterial whether the judgment is based on a
guilty verdict, a finding of guilt, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo
contendere. 185
A hearsay exception is required because the judgment is a proxy
for the evidence which the prosecution offered or would have offered
in its case-in-chief to make out a prima facie case. The purpose of the
exception is not to prove the fact of conviction-the business or offi-
cial records exceptions can be used for that purpose-but to prove
the misconduct underlying the conviction.
The Federal Rule differs from the Code in several respects. First,
the Federal Rule retains the traditional approach of excluding from
the exception felony grade convictions based on a plea of nolo con-
tendere. 186 The purpose of such a plea is to encourage criminal de-
fendants to forego the right of trial without fear that the plea might
be offered against them as a party admission in a subsequent civil ac-
tion for damages. The California Legislature amended the Code in
1982 to remove this exclusion in order to facilitate suits by crime
victims.
Second, the Federal Rule allows the use of judgments of convic-
tions in criminal and civil trials.'8 7 But to avoid constitutional con-
cerns, the Federal Rule does not allow the use of a judgment of
conviction of a third person when offered by the prosecution against
the accused. 188 For example, under the Federal Rule the prosecution
may not use a thief's conviction to prove that the accused possessed
stolen postage stamps. 8 9 California avoids the problem by limiting
the use of such judgments to civil cases.
183. Pruett v. Burr, 257 P.2d 690, 698 (Cal. 1953); see FED. R. EvID. 803(7) advisory
committee's note.
184. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1300 (West 1995).
185. See id.
186. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at advisory committee's note.
[Vol. 37
Winter 2003]
M. Judgments Against Persons Entitled to Indemnity
The Code creates a hearsay exception for final judgments offered
by ajudgment debtor to prove any fact which was essential to the judg-
ment in an action seeking to recover partial or total indemnity or ex-
oneration for money paid or liability incurred on account of the
judgment, to enforce a warranty to protect the judgment debtor
against liability determined by the judgment, or to recover damages
for breach of a warranty substantially the same as the warranty deter-
mined by the judgment to have been breached. 190 The Federal Rules
do not contain an equivalent exception.
N. Judgments Determining the Liability of a Third Person
When the liability, obligation, or duty of a third person is an issue
in a civil action, the Code creates a hearsay exception for a final judg-
ment against that person when offered to prove such liability, obliga-
tion, or duty.191 The Rules do not contain an equivalent exception.
0. Former Testimony
Under the Code and the Rules, former testimony may be admissi-
ble if the proponent first establishes the unavailability of the witness at
the hearing in which the testimony is offered. 192 The Code and the
Rules provide a hearsay exception for testimony given by a witness at
another hearing of the same or different proceeding, or in a deposi-
tion taken in another action if the party against whom the testimony is
offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testi-
mony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 193 In addition, the
Code allows the use of former testimony against a party in a civil ac-
tion who was not a party to the original action if the party to the origi-
nal action had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness
with an interest and motive similar to those which the opponent has at
the current hearing. 19 4 The Federal Rule allows the use of the testi-
mony in such circumstances only if the opponent's "predecessor in
interest" had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testi-
mony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 195
190. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1301 (West 1995).
191. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (WEST 1995).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1292 (West 1995).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
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The meaning of the term "predecessor in interest" is uncer-
tain. 196 The Code avoids the term and, instead, describes with particu-
larity the circumstances which the former testimony may be offered
against a party who was not a party to the original action.197 The
Code's approach should be retained because (simple summary would
be helpful here).
As a general rule, the Code and the Rules allow the party oppos-
ing the former testimony to object to a question or answer on the
same grounds as if the declarant were on the stand testifying. 198 But
where the former testimony is offered against a party to the former
proceeding, the Code precludes the opponent from objecting to the
form of the question unless the opponent objected on that ground at
the former hearing. 199 The justification is that the proponent should
not lose the answer on account of the defect in the question, since the
opponent had an opportunity to object on that ground at the former
hearing.200 The Federal Rule is silent on this point. Presumably,
under the Rules, there is no need for the opponent to preserve any
objection by objecting at the former hearing.
Under the Code, depositions offered in the action in which they
are taken do not qualify as former testimony. 201 Only depositions
taken in another action qualify.2°z Accordingly, the admissibility of
depositions offered in the action in which taken depends not on the
former testimony exception to the hearsay rule but on the provisions
of the California Civil Procedure Code governing the use of deposi-
tions at trial. If the deposition qualifies as former testimony, then its
admissibility depends on the Evidence Code, not the Civil Procedure
Code. The distinction is important because the waiver provisions of
the Civil Procedure Code are broader than those found in the Evi-
dence Code. In the absence of stipulations, the Civil Procedure Code
requires parties opposing the deposition at trial to show that they ob-
jected to the question or answer on the same grounds whenever the
196. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.99 (2d ed.
1999).
197. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1292.
198. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); CAL. EVlD. CODE §§ 1291(b), 1292(b).
199. SeeCAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (b) (1).
200. See id. cmt. Moreover, had the opponent objected at the former hearing, the pro-
ponent might have easily cured the defect by rephrasing the question.
201. See id. § 1290(c).
202. See id.
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defect might have been cured if promptly presented at the
deposition.2 03
As prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Federal Rule of Evi-
dence, like the California rule, exempted from the definition of for-
mer testimony depositions offered in the case in which they are
taken.20 4 Under the court's rule, the admissibility of the depositions
would depend initially on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Congress, however, amended the rule
to include as former testimony depositions offered in the action in
which they are taken. Two complications resulting from this change
merit discussion.
First, the unavailability grounds prescribed by the Federal Rule of
Evidence are not identical to the grounds enumerated under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 205 Satisfaction of a ground listed only in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure raises questions as to whether
such a ground satisfies the unavailability requirements of the Federal
Rule of Evidence. 20 6 Second, the Federal Rule of Evidence is silent
about whether parties opposing the former testimony must show that
at the former hearing they objected on the same grounds to a ques-
tion or answer the proponent seeks to prove at the current hearing. In
the absence of such stipulations, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
impose this requirement to the extent that the defect in the question
or answer could have been cured if promptly presented at the
deposition. 20 7
The requirement imposes no additional burden on the propo-
nent when the deposition was taken in the action offered. Even under
the rule approved by the Supreme Court, the proponent would have
been subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Those rules, not the exception for former testimony,
would have governed the use of the deposition at trial. That, however,
would not have been true in the case of depositions not taken in the
action offered. Such a deposition would have been governed exclu-
sively by the federal rule on former testimony, not the Federal Rules
203. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2025(m)(2) (West 1995).
204. See FED. R. EvID. 804 federal judicial center note.
205. Compare FED. R. EvID. 804(a) with FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (3) (B).
206. The questions arise because by including depositions offered in the action taken
in the definition of former testimony, Congress made those depositions subject to the un-
availability provisions of the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule when the de-
ponent is unavailable to testify at the hearing. The enumeration of unavailability grounds
under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) is not inclusive.
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d) (3) (B).
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of Civil Procedure. As noted, the federal exception for former testi-
mony contains no waiver provisions. A question, then, is whether by
subjecting both types of depositions to the exception for former testi-
mony and subjecting one kind-those taken in the action offered-to
the limitations of the procedural rules, Congress inadvertently opened
the door to imposing the same limitations on the other kind as well.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not dispositive. The waiver
provisions of Rule 32 apply to depositions offered "[a]t the trial."208
Whether "trial" refers only to the trial of the action in which the depo-
sition was taken is not entirely clear.20 9
The Code avoids these uncertainties by exempting from the defi-
nition of former testimony those depositions offered in the action in
which they are taken. The Code approach is sound and should be
retained.
P. Former Testimony by a Minor at a Preliminary Hearing
The Code, but not the Rules, creates a hearsay exception for testi-
mony given by a complaining witness at a preliminary hearing if the
witness was a minor, the former testimony is offered at a hearing to
declare the minor a dependent child under the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, and the issues are such that the defendant at the prelimi-
nary hearing had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
minor with a motive and interest similar to those which the parent or
guardian against whom the testimony is offered has at the depen-
dency hearing. 21'
At the dependency hearing, the parent or guardian may object to
any question or answer as though the child were testifying at the hear-
ing.2 11 In addition, the parent or guardian may challenge the admissi-
bility of the former testimony on the ground that issues are
substantially new and different from those raised at the preliminary
hearing.2'2
208. Id. 32(a).
209. Some commentators believe that a deposition not taken in the action offered is
admissible under Rule 32 if the testimony given was such "that the party-opponent in [the
other action] had the same interest and motive in his cross-examination that the present
opponent now has." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2150, at
191 (West 1994). The question, however, is not whether such a deposition should be ad-
missible under Rule 32 but whether its use should be governed exclusively by the federal
former testimony exception to the hearsay rule.





The purpose of the exception is to spare the minor the necessity
of testify twice to substantially similar matters, once at the preliminary
hearing and a second time at the dependency hearing. California
should retain the exception because.
Q. Former Testimony and Prior Inconsistent Statements
Sometimes, a witness who has given helpful information to the
police recants when called to testify at the preliminary hearing. A wit-
ness, for example, who tells the police that the accused was the assail-
ant, may claim at the preliminary hearing that she did not see the
assailant. Under those circumstances, the prosecution may call to the
stand the officer who took the statement to repeat the witness' state-
ment. In California, the statement can be received to impeach the
witness and, more importantly, to prove that the accused was the
assailant. 213
If the witness then fails to appear at the trial, may the prosecution
offer the witness's and the officer's preliminary hearing testimony as
former testimony? If at the preliminary hearing the witness had identi-
fied the defendant as her assailant, then that portion of her testimony
would have been admissible against the accused at the trial if the wit-
ness were shown to be unavailable to testify. But where, as in the ex-
ample, the witness recants her out of court identification at the
preliminary hearing, then at the trial her out of court statement to the
officer will not be admissible for the truth in the absence of an appli-
cable hearsay exception. 214 Since the witness does not appear at the
trial, the use of the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent state-
ments is problematical. Under sections 770 and 1235, a prior inconsis-
tent statement may be offered for the truth only if the witness is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the statement before the
close of the evidence. 21 5 A hearsay declarant who does not appear at
the trial is not afforded such an opportunity.216 To solve this problem,
213. See CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1235 (West 1995).
214. A hearsay declarant may be impeached with a statement made by the declarant
that is inconsistent with the hearsay declaration received in evidence. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1202 (West 1995). However, unless the declaration falls within an exception, it may not
be received for the truth of the matter stated.
215. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 770, 1235 (West 1995). Multiple hearsay is admissible if
each hearsay statement meets the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule. See
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1201 (West 1995). This rule is unavailable because the inconsistent state-
ment does not meet the requirements of the exception for inconsistent statements.
216. To satisfy the inconsistency requirement of the exception, the prosecution first
would have to offer that portion of the witness's preliminary hearing testimony at which
the witness denied having seen the assailant.
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section 1294 of the Evidence Code allows the prosecution at the trial
to offer the witness's statement to the officer for the truth of the mat-
ter asserted after offering the witness's recantation at the preliminary
hearing.217
At the trial, the prosecution is limited to proving the witness's
former testimony by videotape or a transcript. If, at the preliminary
hearing, the inconsistent statement was offered through a videotape
taken by the police, then the prosecution may offer the videotape at
the trial. If the statement was offered through the testimony of the
officer who took the statement, then the prosecution may offer that
portion of the transcript of the preliminary hearing containing the
statement. 218
The accused may object to the introduction of the inconsistent
statement on the grounds that the statement to the officer was not
properly received at the preliminary hearing as a prior inconsistent
statement, or that the videotape or transcript does not qualify as for-
mer testimony.219 If the statement is received at the trial, the accused
retains the right to call and cross-examine the witnesses who appeared
at the preliminary hearing to testify about the prior inconsistent
statement.220
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not appear to contain a solu-
tion to this problem. 221 Thus, the California provision should be
retained.
R. Declarant's Unavailability Caused by the Accused
Both the Code and the Rules recognize the need for a hearsay
exception for damaging statements made by declarants who are pre-
vented by a party from testifying. The Federal Rules provide an excep-
tion for a statement offered against a party who "has engaged or
acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness." 222 Under the Federal
Rules, the statement may be offered against any party in a criminal or
217. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1294 (West 1995). The exception also applies to inconsis-




221. Indeed, under the Rules a prior inconsistent statement needs to be made under
oath in some kind of proceeding in order to be received for the truth. See FED. R. EVID.
801 (d) (1). The exception for statements of identification presuppose the presence of the
hearsay declarant for cross-examination.
222. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
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civil proceeding, so long as the proponent proves the foundational
facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 223
The Code places more restrictions on the use of these declara-
tions. They are admissible only in prosecutions charging a serious fel-
ony if, among other matters, the proponent proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the declarant's unavailability was "knowingly
caused by, aided by, or solicited by the party against whom the state-
ment is offered for the purpose of preventing the arrest or prosecu-
tion" of that party.224 In addition, the proponent must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the declarant's unavailability is the re-
sult of kidnapping or death by homicide. 225
Other limitations include proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the statement was made under circumstances which indi-
cate it is trustworthy and not made as the result of promise,
inducement, threat, or coercion.2 26 Corroboration is also required.
The proponent must corroborate the statement by evidence tending
to connect the party against whom the statement is offered "with the
commission of the serious felony with which the party is charged."22 7
Proof that merely shows the commission of the offense or its circum-
stances is insufficient. 228 The proponent must also show that the state-
ment was memorialized in a tape recording made by a law
enforcement official or in a statement prepared by a law enforcement
official and signed and notarized by the declarant in the presence of
the law enforcement official. 229
Procedural safeguards include a requirement that the prosecu-
tion serve a written notice upon the accused of its intent to use the
statement at least ten days prior to the hearing or trial at which the
statement is to be offered, unless the prosecution shows good cause
for the failure to provide the notice. 230 If good cause is shown, the
accused is entitled to a reasonable continuance of the hearing or
trial.231
If the statement is offered during the trial, the judge must deter-
mine its admissibility at a hearing out of the presence of the jury. If
223. See id. at advisory committee's note.
224. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1350(a)(1) (West 1995).
225. See id. § 1350(a) (3).
226. See id. § 1350(a) (6).
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See id. § 1350(a) (3).
230. See id. § 1350(b).
231. See id.
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the accused testifies at the hearing, the judge must exclude all per-
sons, except for the clerk, the court reporter, the bailiff, the prosecu-
tor, the investigating officer, the accused, and defense counsel.232 The
accused's testimony is not admissible in any other proceeding, and if a
transcript is made, it must be sealed and transmitted to the clerk of
the court in which the action is pending.2 33
A final limitation is that hearsay declarations by others that are
included in the admitted statement are inadmissible unless they fall
within an exception to the hearsay rule.234
The numerous California limitations evince an abundance of cau-
tion when abolishing the right of criminal defendants to object to
hearsay even when they have been charged with bringing about the
hearsay declarant's unavailability as a witness. In contrast, the federal
exception can be applied against any party, including the prosecution,
in both civil and criminal cases. Moreover, under the Rules the wrong-
doing behind the declarant's unavailability does not have to amount
to a criminal act.235
S. Statements By Dead Declarants Regarding Gang Activities
California has a limited hearsay exception for sworn statements
by dead declarants regarding gang related crimes.236 The purpose of
the exception is to discourage gang members from eliminating poten-
tial witnesses in prosecutions for gang crimes. California makes it a
separate offense for a gang member to promote or assist any felonious
criminal activity by members of gangs.23 7
The statements may be used only in anti-gang prosecutions and
are subject to numerous restrictions. Chief among these are that the
declarant die from other than natural causes, that the statement relate
to acts or events within the personal knowledge of the declarant, that
the statement be made under oath or affirmation in an affidavit or at
a deposition, preliminary hearing, grand jury hearing, or other hear-
ing under penalty of perjury, and that a verbatim transcript or copy,
or record of the statement, exists. 238
232. See id. § 1350(c).
233. See id.
234. See id. § 1350(e).
235. See FED. R. EvID. 804 and advisory committee's note.
236. See CAL. Evin. CODE § 1231 (West 1995).
237. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 1999).
238. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1231.
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In addition, the exception requires the proponent to notify the
opponent of the intent to use the statement in advance of the hearing
in which the statement will be offered. 239 The proponent must also
persuade the judge that the statement was made under circumstances
that indicate its trustworthiness and render the declarant's statement
particularly worthy of belief.240 Among the circumstances the judge
can take into account are whether the statement was made in contem-
plation of a pending or anticipated criminal or civil matter in which
the declarant had an interest other than as a witness, whether the de-
clarant had a bias or motive to fabricate the statement, whether the
statement is corroborated by evidence other than the statements that
are admissible under the exception, and whether the statement was a
declaration against the declarant's interest.241
The Federal Rules do not contain an equivalent exception. The
California exception is designed to meet a special need in gang prose-
cutions and should be retained.
T. Dying Declarations
The Code and the Rules provide a hearsay exception for death-
bed declarations regarding the cause and circumstances of death if
the declarant made the statement while under a sense of impending
death. 242 Under the Code, the declarations can be offered in a civil or
criminal proceeding.243 Under the Rules, they can also be offered in a
civil proceeding, but Congress amended the rule prescribed by the
United States Supreme Court to limit their admissibility in criminal
cases to homicide prosecutions. 244 According to the House Judiciary
Committee, dying declarations are not "among the most reliable
forms of hearsay. 245 But if that is the case, one would expect the dec-
larations to be excluded precisely in those cases-homicides-where
the stakes are highest, and that call for using only the most reliable
evidence against the accused.
239. See CAL. EVD. CODE § 1231.1 (West 1995).
240. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1231. The United States Supreme Court requires hearsay
admitted against the accused under a novel hearsay exception to be "particularly worthy of
belief." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
241. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1231. For additional limitations on the use of the statements
offered under 1231, see §§ 1231.2-1231.4.
242. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 1995).
243. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242.
244. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (2) Report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
245. Id.
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Under the Code, the proponent does not have to establish the
declarant's unavailability as a condition of admissibility. Accordingly,
dying declarations should be admissible in attempted murder prose-
cutions and personal injury actions even if the declarant unexpectedly
survives and is available to testify. The Rules do require the proponent
to establish the declarant's unavailability, 246 but since the grounds of
unavailability are not limited to death, 247 the declarations should be
admissible in a civil case even if the declarant survives.
California should retain its rule.
U. Declarations Against Interest
The Code and the Rules provide a hearsay exception for declara-
tions against interest if the declarant is unavailable to testify.248 One
difference is that only the Code creates an exception for declarations
against social interest. 249 Congress deleted this category from the rule
proposed by the United States Supreme Court.2 50 Another difference
is that under the Federal Rule a "statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement."251 No such limitation is imposed by
the Code.
The Federal Rules also take a different, more stringent, approach
to unavailability. In addition to such usual grounds of unavailability as
death or illness, in the case of declarations against interest the propo-
nent must also show that he has been unable to procure the declar-
ant's testimony by process or other reasonable means. 252 According to
the House, which added this requirement, the "amendment is de-
signed primarily to require that an attempt be made to depose a wit-
ness (as well as to seek his attendance) as a precondition to the
witness being deemed unavailable." 253 No such requirement is im-
posed by the Code.
One aspect of declarations against interest has been especially
troubling to judges and scholars. If a declaration is disserving of the
declarant's interests and also of the interests of a party mentioned in
246. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (2).
247. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
248. See FED. R. Ev1D. 804(b) (3); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (West 1995).
249. See CAL. EvWD. CODE § 1230.
250. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (3) conference committee report.
251. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
252. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (5).
253. Id. Report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
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the declaration, may the declaration be received against that party?
The California Supreme Court resolved this question in People v.
Leach.254 It held that as a matter of statutory construction the Califor-
nia provision is limited to those statements disserving of the declar-
ant's interest.255
The United States Supreme Court has likewise limited the Fed-
eral Rule only to those statements that are disserving of the declar-
ant's interests.2 56 Thus, the statement, "I am taking the cocaine to
Atlanta for Williamson," though against the declarant's penal inter-
ests, may not be offered against Williamson in a drug prosecution.
Limiting the exception to those statements disserving of the declar-
ant's interests minimizes the risk of offending the accused's confron-
tation rights.
Any change to the California Code should make this limitation
explicit in the rule itself or in the accompanying comment.
V. Statements By Minors Describing Acts or Attempted Acts of
Child Abuse or Neglect
The Code, but not the Rules, provides a hearsay exception for a
statement made by minor victim under age twelve describing any act
or attempted act of child abuse or neglect upon the child.257 The
statement is admissible only at a criminal prosecution if at the time of
the criminal proceeding the victim is still a minor, the statement is not
otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, the judge finds at a hear-
ing outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and cir-
cumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability,
and the proponent informs the adverse party of its intention to offer
the statement.258
To be admissible, the minor must testify at the hearing, unless
the minor is shown to be unavailable as witness.2 59 If the minor is un-
available, the statement may not be received unless the judge finds
that the statement is corroborated by evidence of child abuse or
neglect.260
254. 541 P.2d 296 (Cal. 1975).
255. See id. at 310. Leach's holding was reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Duarte, 12 P.3d 1110, 1116 (Cal. 2000).
256. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994).
257. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360 (West 1995).
258. See id.
259. See CAL. EviD. CODE §1360(a) (3) (B).
260. See id.
HEARSAY
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
The California provision was enacted in response to increased
prosecutions for child abuse and neglect. It should be retained.
W. Statements By Crime Victims Relating Threats
Declarations describing the infliction of physical injury do not fall
within the California exception for state of mind statements if offered
to prove the injuries remembered. 261 Neither do declarations relating
threats by others to injure the declarant if offered to prove the threat
remembered. 262 Following the murder acquittal of 0. J. Simpson, the
legislature enacted a new hearsay exception for these kinds of declara-
tions if the declarant is unavailable to testify.2 6 3
To be admissible, the declaration must be made at or near the
time of the infliction or threat of physical injury 264 In addition, the
declaration must be made in writing, be electronically recorded, or be
made to a physician, nurse, paramedic, or law enforcement official,
and under circumstances indicating trustworthiness. 265
In assessing its trustworthiness, the judge may consider, among
other matters, whether the declaration was made in contemplation of
pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant had an inter-
est, whether the declarant had a bias or motive for fabricating the
declaration, and whether the declaration is corroborated by evidence
other than by the kind of declarations admissible under the
exception. 266
The declaration may not be received unless the proponent in-
formed the adverse party of its intention to offer the declaration suffi-
ciently in advance of the hearing in which it is to be offered, so as to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to oppose
the declaration.2 67
The Rules do not contain an equivalent provision.
X. Declarations By Elders and Dependent Adults
California law punishes certain crimes committed against elders
and dependent adults. 268 Elders are persons who are sixty-five or
261. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1370(a) (1) (West 1995).
262. See id.
263. See§ 1370 (a)(2).
264. See § 1370(a)(3).
265. See§ 1370(a)(5).
266. See § 1370(b).
267. See § 1370(c).
268. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 368 (West 1995).
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older. 269 Dependent adults are persons between the ages of eighteen
and sixty-four who have physical or mental limitations that restrict
their ability to carry out normal activities. The definition includes per-
sons with physical or developmental disabilities, or whose physical or
mental abilities have declined with age. 270
The Evidence Code facilitates the prosecution of these crimes by
providing a hearsay exception for declarations made by elders and
dependent adults who are unavailable to testify. 27' In addition to
meeting the unavailability requirements of the Code, the proponent
must show that at the time of the criminal proceeding the declarant, if
not dead, suffers from the infirmities of aging as manifested by ad-
vanced age or organic brain damage or other physical, mental, or
emotional dysfunctions that impair the declarant's ability to provide
adequately for his or her care and protection. 272
A number of other limitations apply. Pretrial notice by the propo-
nent of the intent to use the declaration is required. 273 The question
of the declarant's unavailability must be determined out of the pres-
ence of the jury.274 If the accused elects to testify at the hearing as to
the admissibility of the declaration, the hearing must be closed to the
public,275 and the defendant's testimony may not used in any other
proceeding. 276
Only statements made by an elder/dependent adult victim are
admissible, and then only if the entire statement has been memorial-
ized in a videotape made by a law enforcement official prior to the
death or disabling of the victim. 277 The statement must be supported
by corroborative evidence. 278 In addition, the proponent must per-
suade the judge that the circumstances attending the making of the
statement render it particularly worthy of belief and that the state-
ment was not the result of promise, inducement, threat, or coer-
cion.279 Finally, there must be no evidence that the unavailability of
269. See § 368(g).
270. See id.
271. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1380(a) (West 1995).
272. See§ 1380(a) (6) (b).
273. See§ 1380(b).




278. See § 1380(a)(5).
279. See § 1380(a)(1).
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the declarant was caused, aided, solicited by, or procured on behalf of
the proponent.2811
The Rules do not contain an equivalent provision. The need to
facilitate prosecutions against victims who suffer from serious age or
developmental disabilities justifies the exception. The numerous limi-
tations are designed to ensure reliability. The California rule should
be retained.
Y. Dead Man's Statute
California at one time recognized the Dead Man's Statute which
prohibited a party who sued on a claim against a decedent's estate
from testifying about any matter occurring before the decedent's
death. Dissatisfaction with the statute led the Law Revision Commis-
sion to recommend repealing the statute. The Code now allows a
party to testify to these matters but balances the advantage by creating
a hearsay exception for those statements of decedents embracing mat-
ter made upon personal knowledge at a time when the matter had
been recently perceived and while the decedent's recollection was
clear.28 1 The judge may still exclude the statement if it was made
under circumstances indicating lack of trustworthiness. 282
The Rules do not contain an equivalent provision. Repeal of the
Dead Man's Statute was good policy. The Code provision should be
retained.
Z. Proof of Business Records By Affidavit
Ordinarily, the proponent must call a qualified witness to estab-
lish the foundation for the introduction of business records. The wit-
ness will identify the record as that of a particular entity and will then
describe the mode of preparation of those kinds of records, including
the time frame for their preparation and the sources of information
customarily used in their preparation. The Code contains a number of
provisions allowing a party to bypass the necessity of calling the wit-
ness by offering instead an affidavit containing the foundational infor-
mation. The most notable provision allows the use of affidavits in the
case of business records which have been subpoenaed.2 83 In addition,
the Code allows a party to use an affidavit by a qualified technician to
280. See§ 1380(a) (2).
281. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1261 and cmt. (West 1995).
282. See id.
283. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1560-1562 (West 1995).
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prove the technique used in taking a blood sample. 28 4 It also allows a
party to use an employer's income and benefit form in a proceeding
to modify or terminate an order for child, family, or spousal support if
certain conditions are met.285
The Rules do not contain equivalent hearsay exceptions for these
kinds of documents. In the case of the broadest category-business
records-production of the custodian can still be compelled in Cali-
fornia if the party requesting the records demands the custodian's ap-
pearance in the subpoena duces tecum. The California exceptions
should be retained.
AA. Records of Conviction
The Code provides a hearsay exception for felony convictions
used to impeach a witness. 286 The Code also creates a hearsay excep-
tion for felony convictions offered in a civil action to prove the con-
duct underlying the conviction. 287 When a party must prove the fact of
a conviction, the party may rely on the exceptions for official or busi-
ness records. 288
Sometimes, however, a party (usually the prosecution) must
prove as true other matters recited in a conviction record. The Code
provides a hearsay exception for recitals in copies of conviction
records offered to prove the commission, attempted commission, or
solicitation of an offense, service of a prison term, "or other act, condi-
tion, or event recorded by the record," if the original meets the foun-
dational requirements of the hearsay exception for official records
and the copy meets the certification requirements for writings in the
custody of public entities.289
The proliferation of recidivist statutes in California often requires
prosecutors to prove facts other than just that of conviction. 290 The
Code provision attempts to ease the proof of such facts. The Rules
have no equivalent. The Code provision should be retained.
284. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 712 (West 1995).
285. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1567 (West 1995).
286. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995).
287. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1300 (West 1995).
288. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1271, 1280 (West 1995).
289. CAL. EVID. CODE § 452(b) (West 1995).
290. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)-(e), § 1197.7 (West 1995).
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BB. Findings of Death By Federal Employees
The Code provides a hearsay exception for a written finding of
death by a federal employee authorized to make such a finding under
the Federal Missing Persons Act. 2 91 The finding may also include the
date, circumstances, and place of the decedent's disappearance. 29 2
The Federal Rules do not contain an equivalent provision. The
Code provision should be retained.
CC. Federal Missing Person Records
The Code creates a hearsay exception for official reports or
records prepared by an employee of the United States who is author-
ized to make such a report or record to prove that a person is missing,
missing in action, interned in a foreign country, captured by a hostile
force, beleaguered by a hostile force, besieged by a hostile force, de-
tained in a foreign country against his or her will, or is dead or
alive. 29 3
The Federal Rules do not contain an equivalent provision. The
Code provision should be retained.
DD. Records of Vital Statistics
Both the Code and the Rules create a hearsay exception for
records of birth, fetal death, death, or marriage..2 94 The Rules require
only that the record be made to a public office pursuant to the re-
quirements of law. 295 Under the Code, the maker must be required by
law to file the record in a designated public office, and the record
must be made and filed as required by law.296 The difference is proba-
bly immaterial.
EE. Statement of Absence of Public Record
The Code creates a hearsay exception for a written statement by a
public employee who is the official custodian of the records in a pub-
lic office, reciting diligent search and failure to find a record when
offered to prove the absence of a record in that office. 297 The Rules
contain a similar exception but require the written statement to be in
291. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1282 (West 1995).
292. See id.
293. See CAL. EvD. CODE § 1283 (West 1995).
294. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9); CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1281 (West 1995).
295. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9).
296. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1281.
297. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1284 (West 1995).
[Vol. 37
the form of a certificate. 298 The Rules allow the proponent to offer
testimony in lieu of the certificate. 299 The Code does not expressly
authorize the use of testimony, but neither does it prohibit its use.
The Rules allow the use of the certificate or testimony to prove
the absence of an entry in a public record to prove the nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of a matter if such entries were regularly made and
preserved by the public office or agency. 3° ° Both the Rules and the
Code provide a similar exception for the absence of entries in busi-
ness records. 30 1 The Code should be amended to allow for the proof
of the nonoccurrence of an event by the absence of an entry in a
public record if such entries were regularly made and preserved by
the public office.
FF. Church Records Concerning Family History
Doubts about whether the hearsay exception for business records
would cover all of the information customarily included in church
records relating family history prompted the Law Revision Commis-
sion to recommend a hearsay exception for church records. 30 2 Under
the Code, a church record meeting the requirements of the business
records exception can be offered to prove a person's birth, marriage,
divorce, death, parent and child relationship, race, ancestry, relation-
ship by blood or marriage, and other similar facts of family history. 30 3
The Rules contain a similar exception.30 4
GG. Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar Certificates
The Code and the Rules permit the use of marriage, baptismal,
and similar certificates to prove the same kinds of facts that can be
proved by church records.3 05 The exception is not limited to certifi-
cates issued by religious organizations and includes those issued by
public officials who are authorized to issue them.3 0 6
298. See FED. R. EvID. 803(10).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See FED. R. EVID. 803(7); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1272 (West 1995).
302. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1315 cmt. (West 1995).
303. See § 1315.
304. See FED. R. EVID. 803(11).
305. See FED. R. EVID. 803(12); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1316 (West 1995).
306. See id.
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HH. Entries in Family Records
The Code and the Rules allow the use of entries in family Bibles
and charts, as well as engravings on rings, family portraits, urns, crypts,
tombstones, and the like to prove the same kinds of facts that can be
proved by church records.30 7 The Code differs from the Federal Rule
in that it includes a nonexclusive list of the kinds of family facts that
can be proved under the exception. 30 8 The Advisory Committee views
the Federal Rule as substantially identical to the Code provision.3 0 9
II. Recitals in Writings Affecting Property
The Code and Rules create a hearsay exception for recitals in
dispositive instruments, such as wills and conveyances.310 To be admis-
sible under the exception, the statements in the recitals must be ger-
mane to the purpose of the instrument, and the dealings with the
property must have been consistent with the instrument. 31
JJ. Records of Documents Affecting an Interest in Property
The Rules create an exception for the record of a document pur-
porting to establish or affect an interest in property when offered as
proof of (1) the content of the original document and (2) its execu-
tion and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that of-
fice.312 The Advisory Committee explains that the exception is needed
to overcome the lack of firsthand knowledge by the recorder when the
record is offered as proof of execution and delivery. -33
The Code does not contain a similar exception. Its need in Cali-
fornia is undetermined.
KK. Recitals in Ancient Writings
The Code and the Rules provide a hearsay exception for state-
ments in ancient writings.314 The California exception is more strin-
gent. The writing must be more than thirty years old, as opposed to no
307. See FED. R. EviD. 803(13); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1312 (West 1995).
308. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1312.
309. See FED. R. EVID. 803(13) advisory committee's note.
310. See FED. R. EVID. 803(15); CAL. Evio. CODE § 1330 (West 1995).
311. See id.
312. See FED. R. EVID. 803(14).
313. See id. advisory committee's note.
314. See FED. R. EVID. 803(16); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1331 (West 1995).
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less than twenty years under the Rules, and the proponent must show
that the statement has been generally acted upon as true by persons
having an interest in the matter.' 15
In California, the age of the document alone is an insufficient
guarantee of trustworthiness to justify the exception. The California
provision should be retained.
LL. Commercial Publications
The Federal Rules create a hearsay exception for market quota-
tions, tabulations, lists, directories, and other published compilations
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupa-
tions.i 16 California provides a more limited exception. It excludes
opinions and does not expressly include market quotations.317 The
federal requirement of reliance by persons in particular occupations
is probably the equivalent of the California requirement of reliance by
a business as defined by in the hearsay exception for business
records. 318 Reliance by a "business," however, has been construed to
include reliance by the public.3 19
Reliance by the public or segments of it and the motivation of the
compiler to foster reliance by being accurate justify the exception.3 20
MM. Statements in Learned Treatises
Statements in books of science, art, and history often coincide
with the kinds of statements that should be offered by experts who are
subject to cross-examination. Receiving these statements under a hear-
say exception can deprive the opponent of the opportunity to test
their validity through cross-examination. Accordingly, the Code ex-
ception for statements in learned treatises is limited to those state-
ments made by persons who are indifferent between the parties, when
offered to prove facts of general notoriety and interest.321
The general notoriety requirement has been narrowly construed
to include only facts that are not subject to dispute.3 22 Such facts in-
315. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1331.
316. See FED. R. EVID. 803(17).
317. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1340 (West 1995).
318. See id.
319. In re Michael G., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 1993).
320. See FED. R. EVID. 803(17) advisory committee's note.
321. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341.
322. See Gallagher v. Market St. R.R. Co., 6 P. 869 (1885). Although Gallagher was de-
cided eighty years before the adoption of the Code, it construed a provision virtually iden-
tical with section 1341.
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clude definitions found in dictionaries, life expectancies found in ac-
tuarial tables, information found in tables of weights and measures,
and information found in currency, annuity, and interest tables.3 2-3
Facts of general notoriety do not include statements in medical trea-
tises, as "medicine is not considered one of the exact sciences."
324
Medicine is, instead, the kind of field in which knowledge changes;
consequently, "if [medical] treatises were to be held admissible, the
question at issue might be tried, not by testimony, but upon excerpts
from works presenting partial views of variant and perhaps contradic-
tory theories."325
The fact that experts can be cross-examined about the content of
learned treatises does not affect the limitations on the admissibility of
statements in such works. Under the Code, expert witnesses, including
medical experts, may be cross-examined about the content or tenor of
any scientific journal or treatise if one of three conditions is satisfied:
(1) the expert referred to, considered, or relied upon the publication
in arriving at or in forming the expert opinion; (2) the publication
has been admitted in evidence; or (3) the publication has been estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the ex-
pert or another expert, or by judicial notice. 326 But the right to
conduct such a cross-examination does not mean that the portion of
the publication used is in evidence for the truth of the matter
stated. 327 The pertinent statements may not be read to the jury for the
truth of the matter stated unless the publication has been admitted or
qualifies for admission under a hearsay exception, such as the one for
learned treatises.3 28
The Federal Rules take a more generous approach to the admissi-
bility of information contained in learned treatises. There, statements
contained in such treatises (including medical ones) may be admitted
for the truth of the matter asserted if (1) such statements are estab-
lished as reliable authority by expert testimony or judicial notice, and
(2) the treatise was relied upon by an expert witness on direct exami-
nation or was called to the expert's attention on cross-examination.3 29
Thus, when a treatise has been established as authoritative, appropri-
ate passages may be offered in evidence so long as an expert is on the
323. See id. at 871.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 872.
326. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 721(b) (West 1995).
327. See id. cmt.
328. See § 721(b).
329. See FED. R. EvIn. 803(18).
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stand and available to explain and assist in applying the treatise.330 If
admitted, the passages may be read into evidence but may not be re-
ceived as exhibits. 331 This limitation is designed "to prevent jurors
from overvaluing the written word and from roaming at large through
the treatise thereby forming conclusions not subjected to expert ex-
planation and assistance." 3 32
In federal court, the cross-examiner does not have to show that
the expert relied on the treatise. The Rules thus avoid the possibility
that the outset the expert might block cross-examination at the outset
by refusing to concede reliance on the treatise.333
The concerns giving rise to the California limitations on the use
of statements in learned treatises appear to be taken into account fully
by the more generous and practical treatment accorded such state-
ments by the Federal Rule. Consideration should be given to replac-
ing the California provision with the Federal Rule.
NN. Reputation Concerning Character
A reputation witness does not necessarily offer an out of court
statement for the truth of the matter stated. Instead, the reputation
witness offers a conclusion about whether an individual enjoys a par-
ticular reputation based on what the witness has heard others say or
not say about the conduct at issue. The classic example is the testi-
mony of a qualified witness who states that another witness's reputa-
tion for truth and veracity is good or poor. Although the purpose of
the offer is to prove that the other witness has the kind of character
the witness is reputed to have, the reputation witness is not asked on
direct examination to repeat what he or she overheard others say
about the other witness. But because the reputation witness's conclu-
sion is based on what the witness has heard others say, the Code and
the Rules resolve doubts about the hearsay status of reputation evi-
dence by creating an exception.334 Both permit the conclusion to be
based on what associates or community members say or do not say
about the pertinent character trait.3 35
The differences between the California and federal provisions are
not material. California, however, emphasizes that reputation among
330. See id. advisory committee's note.
331. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
332. MICHAEL H. GRA-AM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.18 (3d ed. 1991).
333. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's note,
334. See FED. R. EVID. 803(21); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1324 (West 1995).
335. Id.
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associates should be limited to those with whom a person habitually
associates. 336
00. Reputation Concerning Family History
The Rules create a hearsay exception for reputation concerning a
person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, rela-
tionship by blood, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family
history.33 7 The reputation can be based on what family members, asso-
ciates, or community members say about the pertinent personal or
family fact.338
The Code, on the other hand, has two separate provisions: one
relates to reputation among family members,339 and the other to rep-
utation among community residents. 340 Reputation among commu-
nity residents is limited to the date of birth or fact of birth, marriage,
divorce, or death of a person. 34I Reputation among associates is not
expressly included under either provision.
PP. Reputation Concerning Boundaries
The Code and the Rules create a hearsay exception for reputa-
tion in a community concerning boundaries of or customs affecting
land in the community provided the reputation arose before the con-
troversy. 342 The provisions are substantially identical.
QQ. Reputation Concerning Community History
The Code and the Rules create a hearsay exception for reputa-
tion concerning an event of general history important to the commu-
nity, state or nation in which the event took place. 343 The provisions
are substantially identical.
RR. Reputation Concerning Public Interest in Property
The Code, but not the Rules, creates a hearsay exception for rep-
utation in a community concerning the interest of the public in prop-
erty in the community if the reputation arose before the
336. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1324.
337. See FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
338. Id.
339. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1313 (West 1995).
340. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1314 (West 1995).
341. Id.
342. See FED. R. EvID. 803(20); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1322 (West 1995).
343. See FED. R. EVID. 802(20); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1320 (West 1995).
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controversy. 344 The California provision was designed to codify ex-
isting law.3 45
SS. Statements Concerning Boundaries
The Code, but not the Rules, creates a hearsay exception for
statements concerning the boundary of land if the declarant is un-
available to testify and had sufficient knowledge of the subject. 346 The
judge is expressly empowered to exclude the statement if it was made
under circumstances indicating a lack of trustworthiness. 34 7 The Cali-
fornia provision was designed to codify existing law. 3
48
TT. Judgments Concerning Personal, Family, or General History,
or Boundaries
The Rules create a hearsay exception forjudgments when offered
as proof of matters of personal history, family or general history, or
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if those matters would be prov-
able by evidence of reputation. 349 The federal provision is justified by
the belief that judgments offered for these purposes are as reliable as
reputation evidence offered for the same purposes. The Rules create a
hearsay exception for reputation evidence offered to prove such
matters.3
5 0
California does not have an equivalent provision.
UU. Statements Concerning a Declarant's Own Family History
The Code and the Rules create an exception for statements con-
cerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legiti-
macy, relationship by blood, ancestry, race, or other similar fact of
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring
personal knowledge of the matter stated, if the declarant is unavaila-
ble to testify.3 5 1 The California provision expressly authorizes the
judge to exclude the declaration if made under circumstances indicat-
ing lack of trustworthiness. 352 Accordingly, the declarant's motive to
tell the truth or lie goes to admissibility, not just weight.
344. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1321 (West 1995).
345. See id. cmt.
346. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1323 (West 1995).
347. See id.
348. See id. cmt.
349. See FED. R. EVID. 803(23).
350. See FED. R. EVID. 803(19)-(20).
351. See FED. R. EVID. 804(4) (A); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1310 (West 1995).
352. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1310.
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The California provision should be retained.
VV. Statements Concerning the Family History of Another
The Code and the Rules create a hearsay exception for state-
ments concerning the birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy,
relationship by blood, ancestry, race, death or other similar fact of
family history of another person, if the declarant is unavailable to tes-
tify and the declarant was related by blood or marriage, or was so inti-
mately associated with the other person's family as to be likely to have
accurate information about the matter declared. 3 53 In California, the
proponent must also show that the declarant made the statement
upon information received from the other person, or from a person
related by blood or marriage to the other person, or upon repute in
the other person's family.354
A California judge can exclude the statement if made under cir-
cumstances indicating lack of trustworthiness. 35 5 The California provi-
sion should be retained.
WW. Hearsay Offered at Preliminary Hearings
As a result of Proposition 115,356 hearsay may now be received for
the truth of the matter stated at California preliminary hearings if of-
fered under Penal Code Section 872.357 This provision allows a magis-
trate to base a probable cause finding in whole or in part upon the
sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating out of court
statements. 3 58 Prior to the initiative, the use of hearsay at preliminary
hearings was subject to the Evidence Code.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to federal prelimi-
nary examinations. 359 The California provision should be retained.
353. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1311; 803(4) (B) (West 1995).
354. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1311.
355. See id.
356. See Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Proposition 115 (ap-
proved June 5, 1990) (codified at CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 14.1, 24, 29, 30; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 223, 223.5 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1203.1 (West 1995); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 189, 190.2, 190.41, 190.5, 206, 206.1, 859, 866, 871.6, 872, 954.1, 987.05, 1049.5,
1050.1, 1054, 1054.1, 1054.2, 1054.3, 1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7, 1102.5, 1102.7, 1385.1,
1430, 1511 (West Supp. 1998)).
357. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1203.1.
358. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872.
359. See FED. R. EvID. 1101 (d) (3).
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XX. Residual Exception
The Rules empower the trial judge to fashion new hearsay excep-
tions for statements not covered by the Rules "but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" if the proponent meets
certain conditions. 360 These include requirements that the statement
be probative of a material fact, be more probative of the point for
which it is offered than any other available evidence which the propo-
nent can obtain through reasonable efforts, and best serve the inter-
ests of justice. 36' This innovative approach to the hearsay exceptions
was prompted by an unwillingness "to assume that all possible desira-
ble exceptions to the hearsay rule have been catalogued and to pass
the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed system. 3 62
The Code does not create a closed system either. Under the
Code, exceptions to the hearsay rule may be found either in statutes
or in decisional law. 363 But, unlike the Federal Rules, the Code does
not empower trial judges to craft an exception for evidence offered in
the case being tried. The Code, however, does not strip judges of their
common law power to create new exceptions for classes of evidence
for which there is a substantial need and which possess such intrinsic
reliability as to enable the exceptions to surmount constitutional and
other objections that generally apply to hearsay.364
YY. Hearsay and Confrontation
The right of the accused to confront their accusers places some
limits on the use of hearsay against criminal defendants. The Code
recognizes that hearsay that satisfies the requirements of an exception
may nonetheless be excluded if receiving it would violate a defen-
dant's federal and state constitutional rights. 365 The Federal Rules do
not contain an equivalent provision, as none is necessary to exclude
evidence that is inadmissible on constitutional grounds.
360. FED. R. EvID. 807.
361. See id.
362. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) advisory committee's note.
363. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200 cmt. Adoption of the Code did not repeal by implica-
tion any other statute relating to hearsay evidence. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1205 (West 1995).
364. See In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340, 1348 (Cal. 1997).
365. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1204 (West 1995).
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ZZ. Multiple Hearsay
The Code and the Rules provide that hearsay within hearsay is
admissible if each hearsay declaration meets the requirements of an
exception.3 66
IV. Cross-examination of the Hearsay Declarant
When a hearsay declaration is received under an exception, the
hearsay declarant in effect has testified even though the declarant may
not have appeared as a witness. The jurors, after all, are entitled to
consider the hearsay declaration for the truth of the matter asserted.
As a rule, then, both the Code and the Federal Rules permit the party
opposing the hearsay declaration to impeach the hearsay declarant in
the same manner as if the declarant had appeared and testified.367
In the case of declarants who do testify, any statements they have
made that are inconsistent with their testimony can be offered to im-
peach them. Moreover, in California their statements can be offered
to prove the truth of the matters stated so long as the declarants are
given an opportunity to explain or deny their statements under oath
and in the presence of the fact finder before the close of the evi-
dence. 368 But when the "witness" to be impeached is a hearsay declar-
ant who does not appear as a witness, two problems arise when the
impeaching party seeks to discredit the declarant with statements by
the declarant that are inconsistent with the hearsay declaration that
has been received in evidence.
One is that the inconsistent statement may not be a prior inconsis-
tent statement but must be a subsequent one: the declarant may have
made the inconsistent statement after making the hearsay declaration
that was received in evidence. Both the Code and the Rules nonethe-
less allow the impeaching party to use the statement.369 Since the de-
clarant did not appear as a witness, the impeaching party did not have
an opportunity to examine the declarant about the nature or the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay declaration.
366. See FED. R. EvID. 805; CAL. EvID. CODE § 1201 (West 1995).
367. See FED. R. EviD. 806; CAL. EViD. CODE § 1202 (West 1995).
368. The Federal Rules impose additional limits on inconsistent statements offered for
the truth of the matter asserted. The statement must be made under oath in some kind of
proceeding. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (A).
369. See FED. R. EVID. 806; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202. The impeaching party, however,
must be the party against whom the hearsay declaration was offered, People v. Beyea, 113
Cal.Rptr. 254, 264 (Ct. App.1974), even though § 1202 does not contain such a limitation
and § 785 allows the calling party to impeach his own witnesses.
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Therefore, the Code and the Rules recognize that fairness requires
allowing the impeaching party to use the inconsistent statement even
if the declarant made the statement after making the hearsay declara-
tion that has been received in evidence.
The other problem concerns the interests of the party who of-
fered the hearsay declaration in the first place. When, as in the exam-
ple, the hearsay declarant does not appear as a witness, the proponent
of the hearsay declaration is deprived of an opportunity to have the
declarant explain or deny the inconsistent statement attributed by the
opponent's witnesses to the declarant. Under the rules governing the
use of conventional inconsistent statements, the absence of such an
opportunity would be fatal to the introduction of the inconsistent
statement.370 But that is not the case when the inconsistent statement
is offered to impeach a hearsay declarant. Since the proponent has
benefited from the introduction of the absent declarant's hearsay dec-
laration, the opponent will be permitted to use the inconsistent state-
ment even though the proponent may be deprived of the opportunity
to have the declarant explain or deny the inconsistent statement.37'
Under the Code, however, the proponent is entitled to some consola-
tion: unless the impeaching statement falls within a recognized excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, the inconsistent statement may be received
only for impeachment and not for the truth of the matter stated.372
The Federal Rules are silent on this point. But one can expect the
same outcome. Unless the inconsistent statement falls within a recog-
nized exception or exemption to the federal hearsay rule, the state-
ment may be received only to impeach the hearsay declarant.
Although the Code and the Rules focus on the use of inconsistent
statements to impeach the hearsay declarant, both permit the use of
any impeaching evidence that would have been admissible if the de-
clarant had appeared and testified. 373 Both also allow the credibility of
the hearsay declarant to be supported by any evidence that would
have been admissible for that purpose if the declarant had testified as
a witness. 374 Further, they both permit the party opposing the hearsay
declaration to call and examine the declarant as if under cross-exami-
370. See FED. R. EVID. 613(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 770 (West 1995).
371. See FED. R. EVID. 806; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202.
372. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202 and cmt.
373. See FED. R. EVID. 806; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202; see, e.g., People v. Stevenson, 145
Cal. Rptr. 301, 309 (Ct. App. 1978) (the party opposing the hearsay statement may im-
peach the hearsay declarant with a felony conviction involving dishonesty); Accord People v.
Jacobs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 789 (Ct. 2000).
374. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1202.
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nation.3 75 The Code, however, does not permit the use of leading
questions if the hearsay declarant is a party, a person identified with a
party, or a witness who has testified in the action concerning the sub-
ject matter.3 76
The California provision is more comprehensive than the Federal
Rule and should be retained.
375. See FED. R. EVID. 806; CAL. EviD. CODE § 1203 (West 1995).
376. See CAL. Evio. CODE § 1203.
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